

THE ONTOLOGICAL WELTANSCHAUUNG OF ISLAM

**A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
THE CONCEPT OF TIME**

SHIGEYUKI YOSHIDA

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**THE INSTITUTE OF MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
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I devote my final appreciation to this world and the universe, which is prolific, and sometimes tender, sometimes hostile.

Shigeyuki Yoshida
November, 1986

Preface

We believe that it should be necessary for a student of the Middle Eastern Studies to become acquainted with the metaphysical thought of Muslim people if he wishes to gain insight into the realities of various phenomena in that region, because in general, Muslims have a strong tendency to attach more importance to metaphysical values than to material values even in their ordinary life. The Middle East has a long established tradition of metaphysics. The behavior pattern of people in the Middle East is often governed by the corollaries of their metaphysical arguments. Therefore, we can say, their metaphysical ideas are an important part of their so-called "primary level culture." In this sense, Mr. S. Yoshida's analysis of the Muslim concept of time which is attempted in this volume, is, we believe, a very useful contribution for understanding the Islamic world.

Mr. S. Yoshida is a research fellow of IMES at present and is engaged in the study of Islamic philosophy. He is a promising researcher with high academic abilities in this field.

Akiro Matsumoto
General Editor

I

Transformation

It seems that a long time has already passed since we obtained the feeling that we are involved in instability and that we are suffering from alienation from ourselves. In spite of the fact that all people appear to be enjoying their daily life, they cannot be free from some ambiguous anxiety and frustration. We feel as if we have lost our own standing places.¹ Although we cannot decide easily whether these negative emotions are essential to the existence of human beings (as in the case of the 'Angst'(anxiety) of Heidegger) or whether they are peculiar to the modern world and the people in it, there is no doubt that the self-consciousness of such a fluctuating situation is serious at least to the human beings who are alive in this modern society.

Anxiety will occur only when the surroundings are ambiguous and opaque, and our present anxiety especially seems to have resulted from the fundamental instability and fluctuation of our values and general Weltanschauung(world-view), which is one of the

peculiarities of the modern world. We cannot leave our situation as it is.

The peculiarities of the modern world manifest themselves in various aspects and phases. First of all, let us pay attention to the fact that the previously optimistic methodologies of the sciences for approaching the universe in general are threatened these days.

Since the establishment of the modern sciences, particularly the natural sciences, in the seventeenth century, science has enjoyed its absolute superiority in human intellectual activities and people have devoted themselves to the pure evolutionary development of these sciences, which recently have been known as science-technology. However, ironically enough, this development has brought various destructive factors and the situation of its self-negation. Then, we can no longer leave what is usually called progress to itself, but, in spite of such a situation, worship of independent science-technology is still quite influential.

The total and complete dependence of human activities on the sciences which has been established in modern western society has caused the confusion of modernization with westernization all over the world.

It is needless to refer to the evil influence of this tendency which has expanded to the world as a whole. The ethno-centrism of the West, a typical example of which is Hegelian philosophy of history, cannot but be reconsidered critically in the political, economic and cultural multipolization of the world today, especially in the postwar period. In that sense, people seem to have begun to notice little by little that history is a kind of interpretation by human beings, not an innate truth in itself.

Secondly, among the various peculiarities of the modern western sciences, the influence of its dualism on human activities in building the image of the world has been quite strong and thorough. The classical religious and philosophical dualism, such as body-spirit and sacred-profane, has been modified and fixed in the establishing process of the modern sciences since the seventeenth century. For example, the Cartesian theory was regarded as an atheistic mechanism as a result of its dualism of mechanistic body and spiritual mind, in spite of the fact that Descartes himself intended to prove and praise the absolute existence of God. As the primitive classical dualism lost its integrating principle, only the outlining form of the dualistic structure and the cognitive mode of

the separated extreme elements were left and expanded to all the spheres of human intellectual activities independently. This tendency can be found everywhere, such as in the separation of sciences from religions and of actual practices from speculative activities, the segmentation of human intellect into divided sciences.

Although the world appears to have developed along the western progress of intelligence, the western optimistic world-view has come to a state of deadlock today. Western optimism is no longer anything else but a dangerous arbitrary interpretation of the self-existent world.

As for these difficulties which the whole world is confronting, radical philosophical reconsideration is demanded of original and radical meaning. Human activities can no longer be left in a state of arbitrariness and accidentality.

Recently, some kinds of transformation of western intelligence have gradually appeared as a result of the deadlock in the previous methodologies of approach and in the attention to phenomenological attitude.

Dualism, which was mentioned above, cannot be exceptional. It is suspended in doubt today and even western intellectuals seek to negate or modify it.

The mechanism which results from dualism

manifested itself as reductionism. That is, it was believed that all events and matters could be reduced to finite partial elements. However, for example, Gestalt psychology which appeared in the twentieth century insists that the whole is different from the total sum of the constituent parts, and the discoveries of modern biology have negated the simple mechanism.

On the other hand, Newtonian dynamics assumed the existence of an omnipresent absolute subjectivity which observes events and matters. However, the theory of relativity made the absolute co-ordinates, that is time and space, changeable and relative, and moreover, quantum dynamics clarifies the interdependence between an observer and observed things. Thus, we noticed that the relationship between subject and object is not so simple and linear.

In the twentieth century, the appearance of such tendencies has been based upon methodological relativism, which has relativized the western way of thinking itself and sought a new inclusive methodology.

Then, the frameworks of human speculative activities and the concepts which had been regarded as objective and self-evident until today have begun to be

relativized and reconsidered with the influence of phenomenology and the new trend of the modern sciences. In such a tendency, all events and matters in the world are reinterpreted phenomenologically with relation to total cosmology which implicates religious and metaphysical concerns.

While the previous absolute values are in the process of self-destruction, the arguments concerning 'relativism' are increasing today. Relativism reconsiders historical evolutionism and reconstructs the outlook of history in the diachronical aspect, and relativizes the western values and world-view in the synchronical aspect. It is true that the concept of relativism is ambiguous and that a relativistic attitude expels people to a more unstable and fluctuating situation, but we must always keep methodological relativism radically, in order to exclude dogmatism and egocentrism from our studies.

Furthermore, we must recognize that methodological relativism necessarily demands from us self-consciousness of our own way of postulating problems. Self-doubt that our postulation of problems itself is possibly false is necessary and indispensable. The incorrectness of a response is often caused by the incorrectness of the basic positing of the problem itself. Bergson says:

If the fundamental core of the proposed problem includes some contradiction by mistranslating extension to non-extension and quality to quantity, then, should we be surprised with the fact that a contradiction is found again in the solution given to the problem? 2

Now, we must relativize ourselves.

The purpose of this thesis is to scrutinize the Islamic Weltanschauung and its contribution to the modern world, which is suffering from various problems, in the comparative study of the concept of time. The Islamic concept of time will be compared with the western conception in order to elucidate the peculiar manifestation of the Islamic Weltanschauung.

The concept of time of the modern West has been firmly fixed and seldom reflected upon, for it has been regarded as a completely self-evident and unquestionable basic structure of human life, like the air we breathe unconsciously. For instance, Kant represents time as the form a priori of intuition and Newton considers that time is one of the fixed and absolute co-ordinates besides space.

However, in the twentieth century, as the modern natural sciences developed and were transformed fundamentally, various conceptions which had been established self-evidently were put in question and the

concept of time was no exception. The concept of time, too, has begun to be objectified and relativized theoretically. In other words, it has been noticed that the western way of thinking itself should be objectified concerning time and that there is a possibility that other modes of time can exist. Then, this problem cannot be investigated just inside the established western framework of speculation and that framework itself should be re-examined. The postulation of the problem must be relativized and scrutinized.

Moreover, we cannot discuss the concept of time only in the theoretical and philosophical dimension separately. For time is one of the various manifestations of a mode of existence of the world, or a Weltanschauung. Time indispensably reflects some total Weltanschauung, as human beings cannot but be beings-in-the-world(In-der-Welt-Sein) and regulated by some social institutions. In other words, to inquire into time is to inquire into the Weltanschauung. Therefore, simultaneously, various sociological problems which the modern world is confronting should be approached from the fundamental level of the existence of the world.

The recent activated tendency and movement of Islam and the most developed methodological attitude of

western intellectuals seem to coincide. Then, what the Islamic Weltanschauung manifests to the modern world is quite suggestive so that we may grope our way to objectify the established modern western methods which have already been at a deadlock and transcend diverse social difficulties.

Notes

¹ John O'Neill expresses such a situation of human individuals as "prosthetic". See, John O'Neill, Five Bodies -- The Human Shape of Modern Society, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1985), Chapter 5.

² Henri Bergson, Essai sur les Données Immédiates de la Conscience (Essay on the Immediate Given of Awareness), trans. H. Hirai, (Tokyo: Hakusuisha, 1975), p. 13.

II

The Western Concept of Time

1. The Postulation of the Problem

If we ask the question, "What is time?" for the postulation of the problem on time, a presupposition has already been hidden. That is, time is treated as a kind of existence, or at least, it is substantiated, as the 'be' of "What is time?" indicates.

According to Aristotle, "'Being' means (i.) accidental being, (ii.) absolute being."¹ If time is regarded as an accidental being, then there have to be some substances upon which time depends in advance. As "'X is Y' means that Y is an accident of X",² time is the relationship among substantive existents and time itself cannot be self-existent.

On the other hand, if time is an absolute being, there cannot be any room for philosophical and theological arguments about time, because time is self-evident and other accidents depend upon time. However, in fact,

The senses of essential being are those which are indicated by the figures of

predication; for "being" has as many senses as there are ways of predication. Now since some predicates indicate (a) what a thing is, and others its (b) quality, (c) quantity, (d) relation, (e) activity or passivity, (f) place, (g) time, to each of these corresponds a sense of "being". 3

Thus, time is not an absolute existence and has to be examined from its postulation.

Hence, at the stage of the postulation of the problem, the tendency toward substantiating time has to be excluded. The question, "What is time?" has to be reserved.

Concerning existence Heidegger asks:

... it is held that 'being' is of all concepts the one that is self-evident. Whenever one cognizes anything or makes an assertion, whenever one comports oneself towards entities, even towards oneself, some use is made of 'being'; and this expression is held to be intelligible 'without further ado', just as everyone understands 'The sky is blue', 'I am merry', and the like. But here we have an average kind of intelligibility, which merely demonstrates that this is unintelligible. 4

If we replace 'existence' with the word 'time', this statement can be applied to the postulation on time as it is. The question on time is quite difficult, for the very reason that it seems completely intimate and self-evident to us. In that sense, we cannot but remember and agree with St. Augustine's statement

In any case, time is simultaneously ~

with philosophy and theology in the theoretical dimension and with the world of our daily life (Lebenswelt) in the practical dimension. When it is recognized that time is essentially connected with human beings for their existence, these two dimensions cannot be separated and neglected, and time has to be investigated as it manifests itself voluntarily in both dimensions. Moreover, insofar as time is one of the representations of the world, those two aspects have to be integrated in some unified form. Therefore, it seems valid to apply the phenomenological methodology here in this study. The primitive and practical consciousness and perception of time in the world of our life should not be ignored even in theoretical studies, for people cannot but live in a mode of time in spite of the fact that it has various kinds of modes. In fact, infinite phenomena appear in and with time.

First of all, it seems necessary and useful to scrutinize various studies on time and inquire into the characteristics of the western concepts of time historically. Then, let us look into sociological problems concerning time.

2. Basic Western Concepts of Time

(a) Aristotelian Concept

Aristotle has had a great influence in constituting the western concept of time. It was Aristotle who gave the first theoretical and unmythological basis concerning time which became the background for the establishment of the modern natural physics or sciences.

According to Aristotle in his 'Physics', time is argued in relation to motion or movement.

First, Aristotle says:

... 'the passage of time' is current everywhere alike and in relation with everything. And further, all changes may be faster or slower, but not so time; for fast and slow are defined by time, 'faster' being more change in less time, and 'slower' less in more. ... It is evident, therefore, that time is not identical with movement; ... 6

Secondly, however,

... we are not aware of time when we do not distinguish any change ..., whereas if we perceive and distinguish changes, then we say that time has elapsed, it is clear that time cannot be disconnected from motion and change. 7

Thus, time is regulated by the mode of changes of entities, while it identifies their changes.

Plainly, then, time is neither identical with movement nor capable of being separated from it. 8

These two regulations of time which appear incompatible with each other are integrated as measure or number which pertains to movement. That is as follows:

... when we perceive a distinct before and after, then we speak of time; for this is just what time is, the calculable measure or dimension of motion with respect to before-and-afterness. 9

Then, we should notice that:

Time, then, is not movement, but that by which movement can be numerically estimated. ... But now, since, 'number' has two meanings (for we speak of the 'numbers' that are counted in the thing in question, and also of the 'numbers' by which we count them and in which we calculate), we are to note that time is the countable thing that we are counting, not the numbers we count in -- which two things are different. 10

Thus, Aristotelian time is measurable and quantitative, and is a kind of duration in that sense, which is different from the concept of the modern sciences where time is regarded as an indurable collection of infinite points, or 'now's. Admittedly, it is more peculiar to the Aristotelian concept that time is argued physically, not metaphysically, in conformity mainly with the material dimension. In other words, Aristotle regards time as an external and

stable substance dependent upon the changes of movement of external entities.¹¹ Such a concept brought both the development of physics in the sphere of the modern natural sciences and serious arguments in the theological and philosophical fields concerning the eternity of the world and its creation by God.

Time is determined by a 'now' and "it is the 'now' that marks off time as before and after."¹² 'Now' is both the initial and the final extremes, or the extremes of before-and-after,¹³ and therefore, the perpetuality of time is concluded logically to make 'now' maintain two extremes at any time. Moreover:

Neither qualitative modification nor growth nor genesis has the kind of uniformity that rotation has; and so time is regarded as the rotation of the sphere, inasmuch as all other orders of motion are measured by it, and time itself is standardized by reference to it. ¹⁴

Thus, it is asserted that "there is a sort of circle of time",¹⁵ and the stability of time is guaranteed by the eternity of rotation of the sphere. The Aristotelian and Greek concept of time in general is cosmic and circular. Additionally, the characteristic of circular perpetuality of time is supported by the statement of Aristotle that:

Indeed, it is evident that the mere passage

of time itself is destructive rather than generative, ... But yet, after all, it is not really time itself that destroys things in this way, but the changes that do destroy take place concurrently with time. ¹⁶

For, the changes of a thing are occurring in and with time and time itself is stable and unchangeable.

(b) St. Augustine's Concept

The general tendency of Greek thought on time is to discuss it in relation to the soul(psychē). Although Aristotle argues on time physically and unmythologically, the description of Plato is mythological and cosmic and Plotinus's theory is Stoic and metaphysical, discussing time as self-development of the psychē.¹⁷

Such Platonic or neo-Platonic thought greatly influenced St. Augustine, who made efforts to integrate Christian or Hebraistic thought and Greek, especially Platonic, thought in his 'Confessions'. As Bertrand Russell says,

... in Origen, Christianity and Platonism lie side by side, and do not interpenetrate. In St Augustine, on the other hand, original thinking in pure philosophy is stimulated by the fact that Platonism, in certain respects, is not in harmony with Genesis. ¹⁸

St. Augustine could not leave Christian dogmatism,

excluding Greek philosophical thought.

First of all, St. Augustine clarifies the fact that time is created by God, and then, he discusses the relations among the past, present and future.

For if there be times past, and times to come; fain would I know where they be: which yet if I be not able to conceive, yet thus much I know, that wheresoever they now be, they are not there future or past, but present. For if there also, future they be, then are they not there yet: if there also they be past, then are they not there still. Wheresoever therefore and whatsoever they be, they are not but as present. 19

Thus, the past, the future and time in general are postulated and discussed from the point of the present.

St. Augustine regulates the three modes of time and their relations in connection with cognitive representations.

* Clear now it is and plain, that neither things to come, nor things past, are. Nor do we properly say, there be three times, past, present, and to come; but perchance it might be properly said, there be three times: a present time of past things; a present time of present things; and a present time of future things. For indeed three such as these in our souls there be; and elsewhere do I not see them. The present time of past things is our memory; the present time of present things is our sight; the present time of future things our expectation. 20

Time is the representation of human consciousness, and it cannot but be dependent upon the mind(anima).

Unless in the mind which acteth all this, there be three things done. For it [the mind] expects, it marks attentively, it remembers; that so the thing which it expecteth, through that which attentively it marketh, passes into that which it remembereth. 21

Although time is substantial at the present, its substantialness is restricted and limited by the mind.

Even if time is the substantial measure of movement as Aristotle argues, St. Augustine recognizes that time is innately subjective in human souls. This conclusion of the subjectivity of time by St. Augustine evidently reflects the Christian teachings. Hence, the philosophical speculation of St. Augustine established the foundations of the subjective and epistemological mode of time, as it implicated a mode of time as substantial co-ordinates.

(c) The Creation and Time

In spite of his important contribution in the philosophical aspect, St. Augustine's interest lay in the theological argument. As for the problem of time, he discusses it in relation to the Creation of the world.

St. Augustine's first standpoint consists of the recognition that "creation out of nothing, which was taught in the Old Testament, was an idea wholly foreign

to Greek philosophy."²²

Greek and other ancient societies in general had the representation of circular time and they identified their fate with the passing of time. In that sense, it seems that the Hebraistic concept of time -- rectilinear time -- is quite peculiar and different.

In Greek thought, "substance is thought of as eternal and uncreated",²³ and it is thought that the world was created from prime substance and that God is just an artificer. On the contrary, in Christian thought, God is omnipotent and He created substance and the world from nothing (creatio ex nihilo). That is to say, Greek philosophers recognize the eternity of the world in the temporal dimension, but Christianity makes the essential distinction between eternity and the concept of time.

The God of Christianity is completely transcendental; He is beyond the temporal dimension, and possesses perfect Free Will. Therefore, as God is free from time and time was created by God, Christianity cannot accept time before the Creation. According to St. Augustine, God created temporal existents not 'in time' (in tempore), but 'with time' (cum tempore).²⁴ Thus, eternity belongs to a completely different dimension from temporality and to

ask what God was doing before the Creation makes no sense at all. Hence, the eternity of God and the temporality of the world are asserted firmly in the Christian faith, as the following statement of Thomas Aquinas clearly shows:

... we must simply concede, in accordance with faith, that a thing caused by God cannot have existed forever, because such a position would imply that a passive potentiality has always existed, which is heretical.²⁵

The Christian concept of time is rectilinear as described above, with two extremes, the beginning and the end of the world and the arrival of the Messiah. Thus, time is discussed restrictedly under the Christian faith, and time is one of the subjective representations to prove the perfect existence and infiniteness of God and the finiteness of the world and creatures in contrast.

Additionally, it is undeniable that this Christian concept of time formed the basic structure of the western physical concept of time in general, apart from the doubt as to whether Christianity itself intended this or not.

3. Innate and Derivative Problems Concerning Time

(a) Reification of Time

The western mode of time and the temporal framework have caused various problems of both a philosophical and a sociological nature. First of all, let us discuss the innate problems concerning time from the theoretical viewpoint.

According to our usual and ordinary experiences of time, we cannot but accept the distinct concepts of the past, present and future. Therefore, the fundamental problem of the study of time seems to consist in "the structure of correlativity between the so-called world of the past (and the future) and the so-called world of the present".²⁶ For, the present undeniably has the peculiar and superior standpoint in time, because our physical bodies and perceptions belong to what is called the present. That is the reason why St. Augustine argues time in a complicated manner and reaches his logical conclusion of the recognition of a present time of past things, a present time of present things and a present time of future things under the emphasis on the present. In this sense, St. Augustine's statement is a sort of logical consequence of the studies on time in general.

However, even if the present can have a peculiar

position in the flow of time, we should be careful concerning the tendency to substantiate the present. For the peculiarity of the present does not necessarily mean the 'existence' of the present as a substance. It should be emphasized here that the problem is not the substantiating of the present itself, but rather, the fact that the substantiating is imposed only on the present in the general psychological and subjective tendency to grasp the mode of time. The substantiating of the present in the cognitive flow of time evokes the consequent reification of the present. In addition, the reification and overemphasizing of the present results in diminishing and alienating the estimation of the past and the future. It can be inferred that the reification of the present and the alienation of the past and future enable us to interpret history arbitrarily as collective of temporal events, which as a result becomes the basis of the ideological reconstitution of history.

Furthermore, even if St. Augustine's conclusion is logically necessary, it seems incompatible with our practical experience. When we perceive the present, it is not always momentary, but rather it usually has some temporal span. For example, when we hear several sounds in a certain short period of time, time is not

necessarily divided into the past, present and future, and our perception does not depend upon memory and expectation to perceive them as a kind of rhythm. However, once the temporal structure which divides time into the past, present and future is strictly established, its universalization results in "the contraction of span of the perceptive present",²⁷ because the perceptive present is also divided into the three modes of time infinitely. It is possible to think that the postulation of the incompatible concept of momentary 'present' or 'now' with our experiences causes several difficulties in the study of time.²⁸ In addition, when time is recognized as the successive collection of momentary presents, time itself, not only the present, is reified and a strange representation of time which cannot conform with the world of our life (Lebenswelt) is brought in. Husserl, for instance, makes the division of the past and future in the perceptible present, that is, retention and protention as a result, in spite of his phenomenological attitude toward time which criticizes "the dogmatism of momentarity of consciousness in total".²⁹

(b) Alienation Concerning Time

Secondly, we will examine the practical

sociological problems concerning the western concept of time.

We should first recognize that substantiated time and space, or what is called absolute time and space as fixed co-ordinates, are peculiar to the modern West. It is true that there is a supporting background which makes the formation of absolute time easily possible, with concepts such as Aristotle's substantial time or the superiority of the present and the consequent reification of time in total in subjectivism concerning time since St. Augustine. However, we cannot ignore the way in which the concept of time is restricted by the period and society in which that concept was established. The Newtonian concept of absolute time and the Cartesian co-ordinates as an ultimate mode of the substantiation of time cannot be exceptions to social restriction.

In the modern western trend, time obtained independence from prescription by perceptive movements and consciousness of a subject, and moreover, independent time became a kind of restriction towards the modes of perception and existence of subjects, that is, human beings. Such a situation is symbolized by the statements of Kant that the representation of time is a priori and that time is a pure form of intuition.

Such transition of the concept of time, however,

does not seem independent of the social situation in each period. As far as Descartes and Newton are concerned, they were at the midst of the establishing of the basic structure of capitalism as a social system in the seventeenth century, and it seems necessary that they were influenced and prescribed by the social tendency of those days, for academic and intellectual activities belong to social activities. Substantiation and absolutization of time can be considered to mean its reification, and moreover, its making into a fetish in the social context. As each physical self was individualized and separated physically and spatially, atomism of time developed and time changed its self-evident and unconscious relationship to a conscious relationship with human beings in the process of reification. Commodification of time proceeded through its reification in the process of the establishment of capitalism, and we consequently acquired the saying, "Time is money," which is usually regarded as self-evident and universal. Thus, it is necessary for us to recognize the way in which this saying is restricted.

Additionally, we should know that the reification and commodification of time developed in compensation for alienation to and from time. Defamilization in society and psychopathic symptoms of urban inhabitants,

for example, seem to have certain relations with alienation from the undivided and organic flow of time.

Moreover, in the speculative and theoretical dimension, too, the unilateral regulation of human individuals by time has been regarded as self-evident, and time has been fixed as the framework or co-ordinates of human life even in the cultural anthropological approach.

4. The Basic Characteristics of the Western Concept of time

(a) Psychologism and Subjectivism

Then, why are such problems able to occur in the western concept and reality?

One of the possible reasons seems to be that it is the result of too great a dependence upon the epistemological and psychologistic tendency in the case of the western argument of thought in general, in comparison with the existential dimension.³⁰

Aristotle argues the problem concerning time in his 'Physics' mainly in the physical and substantial dimension as described above. However, in the end even Aristotle cannot be free from the general tendency toward the subjective or psychologistic argument, whether he himself intends it or not. Aristotle says:

... if nothing can count except consciousness, and consciousness only as intellect(not as sensation merely), it is impossible that time should exist if consciousness did not; ... 31

Aristotle's argument does not go into any more detail and it is true that he discusses the problem physically and substantially in relation to the motion of matter or the heavenly movement, but nevertheless, this kind of ambivalence and the potentiality toward the non-substantial and psychologistic argument should not be neglected in the general flow of the history of western thought.

Kant settles the complete dichotomy of subject and object and thinks that the existence of the world depends totally upon subjectivity, which results in the agnostic postulation of a thing in itself (Ding an sich). Then, Kant's assertion on the mode of time reflects his subjectivistic view. That is, time regulates our intuition and innate condition, while it depends upon our subjectivity and consciousness for its postulation. Time is the intuitive form a priori of inner sense and the formal condition of phenomena in general.³²

Hegel sought to transcend subjectivism such as that of Kant and developed a 'phenomenology' peculiar to him -- phenomenology of mind (Phänomenologie des

Geistes). However, it seems that even Hegel could not subjugate the form of dichotomy of subject and object as Kant settled. According to Hegel, object is outside subject and opposite to subject. Then, time and space are the abstract intuition and the pure form of object regulated by subject. Thus, in spite of their efforts, modern western thinkers could not be liberated from subjectivism and psychologism, because they left the postulation of the dichotomy of subject and object as it was.³³

It is usually thought that there is some rupture between the physical and substantial concept of time and the subjective and epistemological concept, which are represented by the relations between the concepts of Aristotle and St. Augustine. However, at the same time, it seems necessary to avoid overemphasis of this rupture and to pay attention to their possible historical continuity. For, historicity is constituted of the combination of continuity and discontinuity of events, as a web is made of vertical and horizontal threads. Thus, in this case, we should recognize the possibility that there is a latent tendency toward psychologistic and subjective time even in Aristotle's argument and that the concept proposed by St. Augustine is a kind of extreme and radical representation of the western tradition of speculation. Western thinkers

have always been confined to psychologistic epistemological ways of seeing and understanding the world.³⁴ Husserlian phenomenology itself, for instance, fell into the deficiency of psychologism when Husserl intended to seek conceptual quiddity in relation to internal consciousness.

(b) Dualism

Until today, the dualistic method has been dominant and pervasive in western thought and sciences. Dualism which had a direct influence on the modern sciences is undeniably based upon Christian speculation. Briefly, Christianity intends to divide body and soul, the sacred and the profane, seeking the way to emancipate our soul from our bodies.

* However, the problems concerning dualism today do not come from the dualistic methodology itself, but from the transformation of the attitude toward dualism. That is, insofar as the relations between two elements of dualism, such as body and soul, the sacred and the profane, are flexible and interpenetrating, and we are aware of the methodological mode of dualism, dualism itself does not cause such serious difficulties -- fragmentation of the world. The problem is rather implicated in the process of fixation of each extreme

element and making their interpenetration impossible. One of the probable causes of such a tendency seems to lie in the Christian intentionality toward internal consciousness in western thought and culture which cannot be separated from the Christian cultural background. In other words, the inherent dynamism of history and the activities of human beings can be easily neglected in its too psychologistic and subjective interpretation. Therefore, if it is supposed that methodologically the dualistic approach has inevitability and some universality to human intellectual activities, the recent argument of complementary dualism can be accepted in the restriction of the western or Christian-influenced context. Additionally, recent developments in the natural sciences, such as the theory of relativity and quantum dynamics, are demanding that we reconsider the fixed epistemological mode of dualism itself and the separation of physical or scientific arguments from metaphysical or religious aspects.

Concerning time philosophically, it is not simply rectilinear, as it is fixed as the past, present and future in the psychologistic and epistemological present. Not only is the present not subjective and psychologistic, but moreover, the past and future are

something more (etwas Mehr) or something another (etwas Anderes),³⁵ even though they are recognized at the present.

5. Possibility of Another Mode of Time

Phenomenologists who followed Husserl have sought to transcend the psychologism and subjectivism which have characterized western thought and the deficiency into which Husserl consequently fell.

M. Merleau-Ponty makes efforts to subjugate the psychologistic centrism of the present and transform the concept of time itself.

Time is, therefore, not a real process, not an actual succession that I am content to record. It arises from my relation to things. ... What is past or future for me is present in the world. It is often said that, within things themselves, the future is not yet, the past is no longer, while the present, strictly speaking, is infinitesimal, so that time collapses. ³⁶

Then, the past and future and 'time' in general obtain their own positions in the relationship with 'me'.

The past and the future cannot be mere concepts abstracted by us from our perceptions and recollections, mere denominations for the actual series of 'psychic facts'. ³⁷

In addition,

The past, therefore, is not past, nor the future future. It exists only when a subjectivity is there to disrupt the plenitude of being in itself, to adumbrate a perspective, and introduce non-being into it. A past and a future spring forth when I reach out towards them. ³⁸

Thus, time is no longer "a succession of instances of now" "in consciousness".³⁹ "Time is not a line, but a network of intentionalities."⁴⁰ That is to say, time cannot be contracted to the instant of 'now' as a sole reality, but time is the interrelationship between things and 'me'. 'I' as a subject cannot define the mode of time. "We must understand time as the subject and the subject as time."⁴¹

Of what nature, then, is that waking time in which eternity takes root? It is the field of presence in the wide sense, with its double horizon or primary past and future, and the infinite openness of those fields of presence that have slid by, or are still possible. ⁴²

In other words, time is not confined in subjectivity, but subjectivity is regulated by temporality. More strictly speaking, time itself is identical with subject and temporality with subjectivity.

With such understanding, the being, or existence of events and matters is independent of our mind as a cognitive observer.

In short, since in time being and passing are

synonymous, by becoming past, the event does not cease to be. 43

Although the present has lost its superiority as the centre of perception, the present obtains a kind of peculiarity in relation to being.

But the present (in the wide sense, along with its horizons of primary past and future), nevertheless enjoys a privilege because it is the zone in which being and consciousness coincide. 44

All 'I's are temporal beings and are limited as temporal being and being-there (Dasein). However, this kind of passivity and negativity is the very moment to transcend our restriction simultaneously. We are essentially open to both the synchronical world and diachronical history. The possibility of subjugating various sociological problems consists in the transformation of the mode of subjectivity and the acceptance of our primordial openness.

Notes

1 Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. H. Tredennick, (2 vols, Loeb Classical Library, London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1933 & 1935), 1017 a.

2 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1017 a.

3 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1017 a.

4 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Sein und Zeit), trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), p. 23.

5 St. Augustine says:

"And surely, we understand it [time] well enough, when we speak of it: we understand it also, when in speaking with another we hear it named. What is time then? If nobody asks me, I know: but if I were desirous to explain it to one that should ask me, plainly I know not."

(St. Augustine, Confessions, trans. W. Watts, 2 vols, Loeb Classical Library, London: Heinemann Ltd, 1912, Book XI - 14.)

6 Aristotle, Physics, trans. P. H. Wicksteed and F. M. Cornford, (2 vols, Loeb Classical Library, London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1929 & 1934), 218 b.

7 Aristotle, Physics, 218 b.

8 Aristotle, Physics, 219 a.

9 Aristotle, Physics, 219 b.

10 Aristotle, Physics, 219 b.

11 Admittedly, Aristotle's physical and substantial concept of time does not necessarily seem to be independent of consciousness as a subject of recognition of time. In this regard, Aristotle's discussion is ambiguous and not so detailed. As for this problem, I will discuss it later.

12 Aristotle, Physics, 219 b.

13 See, Aristotle, Physics, 219 a.

- 14 Aristotle, Physics, 223 b.
- 15 Aristotle, Physics, 223 b.
- 16 Aristotle, Physics, 222 b.
- 17 See, Gōichi Miyake, Jikan-ron(The Study of Time), (Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten, 1976), pp. 7-20.
- 18 Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1979), p. 351.
- 19 St. Augustine, Book XI - 18.
- 20 St. Augustine, Book XI - 20.
- 21 St. Augustine, Book XI - 28.
- 22 Russell, pp. 351 -352.
- 23 Russell, p. 352.
- 24 See, Francisco Perez, "Christ-kyō no Jikan to Kūkan no Gainen"(The Christian Concept of Time and Space), in Jikan-Kūkan, (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1977), p. 280. See, St. Augustine, Book XI - 13 and 30.
- 25 Thomas Aquinas, On the Eternity of the World (De Aeternitate Mundi), trans. C. Vollert, (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1964), p. 19.
- * 26 Wataru Hiromatsu, Kototeki-Sekaikan eno Zenshō, (Tokyo: Keisō-shobō, 1975), p. 240.
- 27 Hiromatsu, p. 262.
- 28 See, Hiromatsu, p. 246.
- 29 Hiromatsu, p. 262.
- 30 Therefore, we should be careful enough to classify the western concept of time into existential time and cognitive time simply in the western context. The Islamic ontological mode of time which I will discuss later is completely different from the western concept of existential time. See, Shuntarō Itō, "Sonzai no Jikan to Ishiki no Jikan"(The Time of Existence and the Time of Consciousness), in Jikan, Tokyo University Open Lecture, (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1980), pp. 3-42.

- 31 Aristotle, Physics, 223 a.
- 32 See, Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Reinen Vernunft (Critique of Pure Reason), B, pp. 46-73.
- 33 See, for example, G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophische Propädeutik(Introduction to Philosophy), trans. T. Takechi, (Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten, 1952), pp. 253-361, III - 2, "Philosophische Enzyklopädie".
- 34 See, for example, Katsuhiko Itō, Descartes no Ningenzō(The Figure of Descartes), (Tokyo: Keisō-shobō, 1970), Chapter 3, "Ishiki to Sonzai" (Consciousness and Existence). Itō says:
"It can not be said that we have been emancipated from the method itself which makes 'consciousness' in its broadest sense the starting point [even in the recent philosophy]." (p. 175)
- 35 Hiromatsu, p. 258 and p. 266.
- 36 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception(La Phénoménologie de la Perception), trans. Collin Smith, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 412.
- 37 Merleau-Ponty, p. 414.
- 38 Merleau-Ponty, p. 421.
- 39 Merleau-Ponty, p. 412.
- 40 Merleau-Ponty, p. 417.
- 41 Merleau-Ponty, p. 422.
- 42 Merleau-Ponty, p. 423.
- 43 Merleau-Ponty, p. 420.
- 44 Merleau-Ponty, p. 424.

III

Islamic Weltanschauung and Mode of Time

1. A Sketch History of Islamic Thought

Generally speaking, in the process by which a religion is generated, organized and established, the religion cannot remain as a primary form of primitive faith and cannot but be theorized for the argument with its counterparts and the solution of innate logical inconsistencies. Islam is no exception to this tendency.

In the case of Islam, the theorization of the religion as theology and philosophy took place from both internal and external demands, each of which poured into the two main streams: 'kalām' and 'falsafah'.

(a) Kalām

The kalām, "which literally means 'speech' or 'word'",¹ is translated as 'theology', "although the significance of theology in Christianity and of kalām in Islam is not by any means the same".² The kalām is

one dimension of Islamic intellectual activities which was generated mainly from the innate problems of the Islamic religion and belief.

The science of kalām has its roots in the earliest debates in the Islamic community on the questions of free will and predestination, the created or uncreated nature of the Quran, the relation of faith to works, the definition of who is a believer, etc.³

In various complicated situations, such as the death of Muhammad, the expansion of Islam, the accompanying inflow of pagan thoughts, the noticing of innate logical contradictions in the teachings of the Qur'ān, etc, Islamic people were obliged to organize and logicalize their beliefs. In other words, it was basically necessary for early Islam to transcend the simple dependence upon their sensibility and primitive illogical beliefs, and then theorize and firm the basis of their beliefs, in order to cope with and surpass the other heretical thoughts and religions and maintain their own inherent religious community.

As a result of such innate demands, several theological groups arose in the early period of Islam, such as "the Murji'ites, Qadarites and Khawārij".⁴ Each of these envisaged answers to their religious questions and the confrontation and debates among the groups obliged them to construct theoretical and ideal

arguments, particularly concerning their basis of faith. Thus, "Islam made the first mark of theological speculation in this sharp confrontation between Khawārij and the Murji'ites".⁵

In spite of the inception of seeking the true faith of Islam, the flow of the kalām gradually made the people concerned with this activity rationalistic and "connection with the kalām soon gave their thinking a rationalist tinge and compelled them more and more to set themselves rationalist goals". For,

... the religious ideas their teaching particularly stressed (the reduction of the arbitrary power of God in favor of the idea of justice) contained many a seed of opposition to current orthodoxy, ... ⁶

Additionally,

In accordance with its purpose to give support to religious doctrines, the kalām started from anti-Aristotelian postulates, and was, in the true sense of the phrase, a philosophy of religion. ⁷

The first prominent appearance of such tendencies as rationalism and anti-Aristotelianism was the Mu'tazilites. The Mu'tazila put great emphasis on reason('aql) which made it possible for Islamic thinkers to separate the practical dimension(faith) and the theoretical dimension(theology or philosophy) and

speculate philosophically in its narrower sense. In addition, the Mu'tazila "chose a rationalistic interpretation of the Divinity which tended to make God more into a philosophical abstraction than a Reality".⁸

In such a perspective, the Mu'tazila refuted any anthropomorphic ideas and insisted that 'eternity' (qadīm) belongs solely to the essence of God and that all attributes are contingent, or temporal(zamānī). That is, God is the Absolute who transcends any conceptualization and substantiation like time and space. Thus, the Mu'tazilite thought became purely rationalistic and idealistic and as a result such an attitude was far from the primitive faith of the general public. From such a tendency, the argument with regard to the createdness or uncreatedness of the Qur'ān arose.

Necessarily, there arose reactions to the rationalism of the Mu'tazila, which are represented by Ash'arism whose peculiarity was the "development of the theory of atomism".⁹ In its atomism, even time, space and movement are divided into atoms, and for example, time is regarded as the collection of many unsuccessive atomistic 'now's. In other words, God continues to create the world newly every moment.

After the activities of Ash'arī and Imam al-Haramain, the kalām came to fruition: Ghazālī. By

Ghazālī, theology(kalām) and philosophy(falsafah) were related to each other and the kalām was developed, as obtaining two directions, that is, toward both orthodoxy and mysticism(sūfism) and the possibility of their fusion. Ghazālī sought the living faith co-existent with strict and consistent theorization of theology, as having the intentionality toward 'intuition' transcendent to recognition by reason ('aql).

Ghazālī carried out his theological and philosophical arguments in his attack on philosophy (falsafah) at that time, especially in his work, 'Tahāfut al-Falāsifah'(The Incoherence of the Philosophers).

Ghazālī attacked Ibn Sīnā and falsafah which was essentially influenced by Greek thought, particularly Aristotelianism. In Greek thought, philosophers accept the existence of primary matter and primary movement, which logically means the eternity of the world and the negation of the Creator. Such a logical consequence is evidently contradictory to the teaching of the Qur'ān, in which there is description that God, the Creator exists primordially.¹⁰ Thus, Ghazālī accused the heretical arguments of the philosophers.

According to Ghazālī, "The philosophers are

confusing the intrinsic(dhātī) beforeness and the temporal(zamānī) beforeness."¹¹ The world is eternal with God from the viewpoint of temporality. However, God precedes the world intrinsically and God is transcendental. That is, only God is the ultimate Reality, and time(zamān) is not a reality but is nothing but a relationship(nisbah).¹² Because of the limit of their ability of representation, human beings cannot but regard time as a kind of reality.

The representing ability of human beings (wahm), when it thinks of a beginning whatever it is, can not grasp the beginning unless it imagines something preceding it. It is thought as if this 'something preceding the beginning', that is, what the representation can not be independent of, realizes itself. That is time.¹³

In other words, time "depends upon the representing ability of human beings and is psychological and subjective".¹⁴ Hence, according to Ghazālī, time is just a relationship and he refutes the realization of time as the philosophers did. In this sense, time belongs not to the attributes of God, but to this phenomenal world for our subjective representation. That is to say, his thought of tawhīd expresses the idea that God is a sole existence(wujūd) and that the existence of all creatures completely depends upon God as the prime Cause.

(b) Falsafah

Besides the arguments on the innate problems of the Qur'ān in the kalām, on the other hand, Greek philosophy was transmitted to Islamic thought, particularly in the fourth / eleventh and fifth / twelfth centuries, "a period of great activity in the sciences".¹⁵ Islamic philosophy which developed under the indispensable influence of Greek philosophy is called falsafah.

The background for transmitting Greek philosophy into Islamic thought was the Nestorian Christians in Syria who introduced the Greek sciences. With such a background, Greek scientific and philosophical works had begun to be translated into Arabic under the caliph al-Ma'mūn in the Abbāsid dynasty.¹⁶ Thus, it cannot be overemphasized here that Islam had played quite an important role as an intermediate between Greek and western thought since the medieval ages.

At first, the Syrian Christians, such as Hunain b. Ishāq, were engaged in translation, especially of the works of Aristotle, at the institution called the "House of Wisdom" (Bait al-Hikmah) under the patronage of the caliphs at that time.¹⁷ In the process of the accumulation of Greek philosophical works translated into Arabic, the Islamic philosophers came into being,

such as Kindī and Fārābī.

At this point it should be emphasized that the Aristotelian works introduced into the Islamic world had been greatly influenced by neo-Platonism in the process of transmission. This fact implies that the Aristotelianism transmitted into Islam was probably different from the original Aristotelianism, and simultaneously, that the transformation through the influence of neo-Platonism made it easier for Islamic thinkers to accept Aristotelianism and Greek philosophy in general, for, pure Aristotelianism and Islamic monotheism are essentially inconsistent with each other.

Aristotle says:

... it is evident that movement is eternal, and is not something which now was and now was not.¹⁸

In addition, "motion must be eternal and can never cease,"¹⁹ with a prime mover, the representation of which is the cyclical movement of the heaven. Such statements of Aristotle are obviously contradictory to the Islamic doctrines: the Creation ex nihilo and God as the Creator. Therefore, when the Islamic philosophers accepted Greek thought, they were necessarily obliged to neutralize the inconsistency between them and protect their own doctrines. Then,

neo-Pythagoreanism and neo-Platonism could play a mediating role to make their fusion possible.

Ikhwān al-Safā'

In the case of Ikhwān al-Safā' (the Brethren of Purity), in their epistles (Raṣā'il),

Aristotle stands in the shade of the Neoplatonists. The basic concepts and terminology used by the Ikhwān are his. Their development belongs to the Neoplatonists. Several Aristotelian doctrines are mentioned and, indeed, adopted, but discussion in the manner of, for example, the Metaphysics is rare. Aristotelian doctrine seems, on the whole, to have been superficially apprehended. 20

"They took much from Pythagoras and Aristotle and even more from Plotinus", 21 as utilizing the neo-Platonic theories, especially the theories of emanation and hierarchy.

When the Ikhwān discussed "motion, time and space", "it was cosmology rather than physics" 22 and their discussion was "more from their cosmological aspect than from the kinematic point of view".

The Ikhwān reject the Aristotelian notion of time as being nothing but the measure of movement, ... 23

In the cosmological and metaphysical dimension of

argument,

Time is also intimately connected with creation and in fact is created with the world. Likewise, the last Day (yawm al-qiyyamah) is not just another day in time but the termination of time itself. 24

Thus, while the Ikhwān intended to harmonize their neo-Platonized Aristotelian concept of time with the Islamic eschatological conception by differentiating the dimension of argument, they also referred to "the psychological aspect of time" 25 as a product of the spirit.

Likewise, the Ikhwān intended the fusion between the neo-Platonic cosmology and the Islamic concept of creation as the theory of emanation in the metaphysical hierarchy.

... the Ikhwān did attempt a kind of identification between two disparate concepts of deity, between The One of Plotinus and Allāh of Islam, though they never directly stated that this was their intention. 26

Hence, the arguments of the Ikhwān and their attempts at fusion are often superficial, and they easily become involved in logical contradictions. In that sense, the activities of the Ikhwān can be regarded as transitional toward al-Bīrūnī and Ibn Sīnā.

The Ikhwān, however, do not proceed much further in discussing the intricacies of

motion in a manner that one finds in the writings of Ibn Sīnā or Abu'l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī. 27

Ibn Sīnā

Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna) succeeded the tide of Aristotelianism in Islamic thought under the influence of the Rasā'il of the Ikhwān al-Safā' and brought about the inception of Islamic philosophy (falsafah) fundamentally which absorbed and fused with Aristotelianism, even though he depended greatly upon neo-Platonic Aristotelianism, for example, upon the book 'Theology of Aristotle', which was in fact not a work of Aristotle. 28

Similarly to Aristotle in his 'Metaphysics', Ibn Sīnā classifies intellectual activities into speculative (nazarī) and practical ('amalī) sciences, and he settles the hierarchy for the speculative sciences. 29 In this hierarchy, metaphysics occupies the summit as the science studying God ('ilm ilāhī); mathematics is second from the bottom, and physics is put at the bottom as it studies matter and materiality. In accordance with such a perspective, "Like Aristotle, he [Ibn Sīnā] wished a special science, metaphysics, to study being as being." 30 Ibn Sīnā established the beginning of the development of ontology in the

metaphysical dimension peculiar to Islamic philosophy, in the interpenetration between such Aristotelian understanding and the innate ontological foundation of Islam. On the other hand, Ibn Sīnā and the Islamic Peripatetics (mashshā'ī) also basically succeeded Aristotelian physics in the physical dimension.

Ibn Sīnā discusses time in the physical realm. Like Aristotle, time is "defined by Ibn Sīnā as the quantity, or measure, of motion", 31 accompanying changes of motion. "If there is no change and no motion, there is no time." 32

Time can only be imagined in connection with movement. Where one cannot feel movement one cannot feel time. 33

In his 'Kitāb al-Ishārāt al-Tanbīhāt', Ibn Sīnā says:

Generation (tajaddud) ... is possible only to a substratum (mawdū'). ... Generation accompanies ... especially what is continuous and indivisible in itself, that is, what can become cyclical (al-wad'īyah al-dūrīyah) -- continuity (ittisāl). This continuity is measured, for both further 'beforeness' and nearer 'beforeness' are the quantity which is measured concerning changes (kamm muqaddar). This measured quantity is time and it is the quantity of movement. However, it is not quantity from the viewpoint of distance, but from the viewpoint of before-and-afterness which can not co-exist. 34

Thus, Ibn Sīnā regards time as the continuity accompanying motion, and he refutes the Ash'arite

concept of atomic time. It is true that time can be divided into what Ibn Sīnā calls the moment (*ān*), but it is possible "only potentially (*bi'l-quwwah*) and imaginatively (*bi'l-tawahhum*)".³⁵

According to Ibn Sīnā, time is accidental and substantial and time is eternal, as Aristotle concluded. Al-Tūsī, commentator of Ibn Sīnā, says:

... The necessity that every temporally generated thing is preceded by time is proved. Additionally, every kind of time is temporally generated, for it is preceded by another time preceding it. Therefore, the necessity of the eternal continuity of time is concluded.³⁶

Hence, as in the case of Aristotle, the physical argument of Ibn Sīnā concludes the eternity of time. Since time is the measurement of movement, the world as the total sum of movers is consequently also eternal. This consequence is evidently inconsistent with the teaching of the Qur'ān, the Creation ex nihilo by God. That is why Ibn Sīnā is called a heretic and attacked by orthodox theologians.³⁷

As shown here, the argument of Ibn Sīnā concerning time is primitive and restricted in the physical dimension. The interrelations of arguments between physics and metaphysics had been neglected and not yet sophisticated. Otherwise, he approaches mystical and gnostic philosophy, proposing the 'Oriental Philosophy'

(*al-hikmah al-mashriqīyah*). Additionally,

Toward the end of his life Ibn Sīnā showed more sympathy toward Twelve-Imām Shī'ism.³⁸

And,

It is only in the Shī'ite world that the philosophy of Ibn Sīnā as interpreted by Suhrawardī and later combined with the gnostic doctrines of Ibn 'Arabī became integrated by Mullā Sadrā into the intellectual perspective of Shī'ism and has thus remained as a living tradition in Persia until today.³⁹

Thus, the falsafah and the theoretical perspective of Islam developed particularly in Shī'ism.

Ibn Rushd

As we have seen above, Ghazālī criticized the falsafah which culminated in Ibn Sīnā and caused decisive damage to the falsafah. One of his works especially, 'Tahāfut al-Falāsifah' (The Incoherence of the Philosophers) "brought the career of philosophy ... to an end in the Arabic part of the Islamic world".⁴⁰ Thus, the eastern falsafah collapsed. Admittedly, the fact should not be overlooked that Ghazālī himself made use of the philosophical methodology of reasoning for his criticism of philosophy.

Protection of the Aristotelian philosophy occurred

in the Islamic West, that is in Islamic Spain and North Africa.⁴¹ With the beginning of the intellectual activities of Ibn Bājjah (Avempace), the western falsafah prospered in the Almohad period in Spain. In this period, Ibn Tufayl (Abubacer) had a influence on Islamic philosophy and was succeeded by Ibn Rushd (Averroes), the summit of the falsafah, not only in the Islamic West, but also in total.

Ibn Rushd sought to protect philosophy from the attack of theology, and moreover, to harmonize philosophy and theology, or reason and faith. In response to the criticism of Ghazālī in 'The Incoherence of the Philosophers', Ibn Rushd wrote 'Tahāfut al-Tahāfut' (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), replying to Ghazālī from the philosophical point of view.

This work of Ibn Rushd begins with discussion concerning the eternity of the world.⁴² Generally, theologians assert that the world must have a beginning temporally because the world was created by God from nothingness (nihilum or 'adam). As regards such a theological assertion, when he discusses the eternity of the world, Ibn Rushd thinks that there is no inconsistency between the Creation of the world by God and the eternity of the world. This is because time

accompanies motion, and therefore, accompanies matter, and then, it is impossible to postulate time in absolute nothingness. Thus, it is concluded that time was also created with the Creation of the world and that the world is eternal (qadīm) in the temporal dimension. If the temporal contingency of the world is supposed as in the case of theologians, it means that God created the world within time and that God is a finite existence restricted by time, which consequently negates the omnipotency of God.

Ibn Rushd says in his 'Discourse on the Manner of the World's Existence' as follows:

The fundamental principles of the Mutakallimun [theologians] with regard to the temporal origination of the world are essentially the same as those of the Peripatetics.⁴³

However, they differ in the manner in which they posit time. That is, on the one hand, the theologians suppose that "the existence of the world is in time, and they [ultimately] posit a temporal beginning for its existence."⁴⁴ On the other hand, the philosophers posit that time is a measure for the world. In other words, there is equivocality among the theologians and the philosophers in the use of "terms like Pre-eternal and temporally originated".⁴⁵ The concept of time of the theologians is primitive and that of the

philosophers is restricted in the physical dimension. We can find in the discussion of Ibn Rushd the possibility of interrelations between physical arguments concerning time and cosmological or metaphysical ones.

In addition, Ibn Rushd maintains that the world is recreated each moment by God, succeeding the assertion of the theologians, especially the Ash'arites. He seeks here the overflowing merciful Will of God.⁴⁶

The philosophy of Ibn Rushd developed, however, in medieval European Christianity as Averroism, and western Islamic philosophy disappeared with the death of Ibn Rushd. Islamic philosophy developed integrally in the Islamic East, particularly among the Shī'ites, with theology(kalām), theosophy('irfān) and mysticism (sūfism).

2. The General Concept of Time in Islamic Thought

Let us observe the concept of time in general which has developed in Islamic thought, especially in Shī'ite intellectual activities. The arguments here are divided into two parts: the one concerns pre-eternity and contingency, and the other concerns the renewal of creation.

(a) Pre-eternity and Contingency⁴⁷

Existence(wujūd) is either pre-eternal(qadīm) or contingent(hādith), which are either relative(izāfī) or real(haqīqī). In addition, what is real is either essential(dhātī) or temporal(zamānī). Therefore, when we examine the reality of the Creation, there can be the following four cases:

1. Essential pre-eternity. This means that the existence of things is not preceded⁴⁸ by essential nothingness('adam-e dhātī). Essential nothingness is defined as 'a thing that requires no existence for its own nature', which has a certain connection with the existence of things as far as things are created. Thus, essential pre-eternity is very special to the nature of the Necessary Existence, that is, God.

2. Temporal eternity. This implies that the existence of things is not preceded temporally by preceding nothingness.

3. Essential contingency. Contrary to essential pre-eternity, this signifies that the existence of things is preceded by essential nothingness.

4. Temporal contingency. This indicates that the existence of things is preceded by nothingness which

precedes actual and temporal existence. This is the most common understanding among people concerning the relations between contingency and the Creation.

Philosophers and theologians have different theories on the problem of pre-eternity and the contingency of the world, that is, of the things except God (mā siwāye allāh), although no one insists on the essential pre-eternity of the world. In other words, the problem is whether the contingency of the world is essential or temporal.

Most Peripatetic philosophers (mashshā'ī) adopt the arguments of essential contingency and temporal eternity to harmonize the Aristotelian concept of time as measure of movement with the Creation ex nihilo by God. The activity of God, or the Creation, is not restricted in the temporal dimension, and therefore, it transcends temporality. In the temporal dimension, all elements of individual things in the world can be regarded as eternal as far as their matter and form are concerned.

Admittedly, concerning the Creation of the world, people keep the primitive image of temporal contingency of the world which is the composite of individual elements. Such an unsophisticated world-view of temporal contingency among theologians and people in

general can be accepted in the visual and traditional interpretation of the Qur'ān.

Two demonstrations of essential contingency have been established. It is demonstrated first when we take a methodology that actuality appears from potentiality. Possibilities (mumkin) demand non-existentiality (amr-e 'adamī), and then, existence is additive and accident of essence. Additionally, accident succeeds its essence. Hence, possible existence is preceded by essential non-existence, or nothingness ('adam-e dhātī). That is to say, possible existence is essentially contingent.

The second demonstration is as follows. If contingency is restricted in the temporal dimension, it results logically in the fact that God had not done anything before the Creation. However, this idea can never be approved because God is essentially omnipotent. Thus, in strict and sophisticated philosophical theory, the contingency of the world is not temporal, but rather essential.

Furthermore, such theories have been developed critically to make the rational demonstration coincide with the Revelation and harmonize philosophy and theology.⁴⁹

It seems necessary to emphasize here that essentiality and temporality are not necessarily

contradictory, but rather that they are complementary as regards pre-eternity and contingency, when discussed in relation to universality and peculiarity.

As for what is essentially pre-eternal and what is temporally eternal, the former is more peculiar than the latter. For, what is essentially pre-eternal is also simultaneously temporally eternal, like God. On the other hand, what is temporally eternal is more universal, because it can be applied not only to God and pure reason ('uqūl-e mujarrada), but also to the Created world.

Similarly, what is temporally contingent is more peculiar than what is essentially contingent, for the former is also essentially contingent at the same time. Therefore, what is essentially contingent is more universal.

However, what is essentially pre-eternal and what is essentially contingent are fundamentally different from each other, which guarantees the transcendentality and supremacy of God. What is essentially pre-eternal, that is, what is not preceded by essential nothingness indicates solely God Himself.

(b) Renewal of Creation⁵⁰

Islamic theosophy ('irfān), which has developed

especially in Shī'ism⁵¹, takes the standpoint of the renewal of creation (tajaddud-e amthāl).⁵²

Theosophers and the Illuminationistic philosophers accept the renewal of Creation of everything in the world of possibilities ('ālam-e imkān) which includes both substance (jowhar) and accident ('araz) or matter and form. On the other hand, the Ash'arite theologians consider that the renewal of creation is attributed only to accident. In addition, the Mu'tajilite theologians and the Peripatetic philosophers do not accept the theory of the renewal of creation.

The renewal of the creation of both substance and accident is maintained by the Islamic thinkers who accept the complementarity of rational knowledge and gnostic truths to reach the truth of God. Rūmī composed the following verse:

Every moment the world is renewed, and we are unaware of its being renewed whilst it remains (the same in appearance).

Life is ever arriving anew, like the stream, though in the body it has the semblance of continuity.

From its swiftness it appears continuous, like the spark which thou whirlest rapidly with thy hand. 53

Moreover, the identity, stability and continuity of each individual being are maintained by God as the origin of emanation. The Free Will of God makes the

emanation possible without any delay and its continuity guarantees the continuity and integrity of the world Created.

Shabistari says in his 'Gulshan-e Rāz',

The world exists as a whole
each moment it becomes non-existent
and does not continue across two moments.
A world appears in another time
The earth and the heaven appear then. 54

Theosophers have developed their argument with the total support of the Qur'ān. For example,

O men, you are the ones that have need of
God; He is the All-sufficient, the All-
laudable.

If He will, He can put you away
and bring a new creation; that
is surely no great matter for God. 55

And,

that We may exchange the likes of you,
and make you to grow again in a fashion
you know not. 56

In other words, individualizations (ta'īnāt) of existence which tend toward non-existence ('adam) are always occurring each moment without any relation to human recognition. Individualizations occur in the temporal and spatial dimensions restrictedly to the extent that beings seem durable and stable in the flow of their existence, that is, as amthāl.

3. The Islamic Weltanschauung and the Concept of Time as its Manifestation

The philosophical argumentation on time which was discussed above has also always been one of the central problems of theology. In such arguments, the concepts of time of Islam and of the West under Christian influence show their structural similarity to each other, insofar as both of them possess the same basic religious structures, such as monotheism, the Creation by God and eschatology. Then, what characterizes the Islamic concept of time in philosophical and theological argument?

As we observed before, Ibn Sīnā regards time as a kind of substance in his Aristotelian view in which time is a measure of movement. On the other hand, in the argument by Ghazālī, time is dependent upon the representing ability of human beings and it is psychological and subjective. Views about time similar to those of both Ibn Sīnā and Ghazālī can be found in the western arguments. However, in the critical development of Islamic philosophy since Ibn Sīnā, its process of development and its peculiarities seem quite different from western speculation.

In order to observe the peculiarities of Islam, let us first discuss the argument on time by Abu'l-Barakāt.

(a) The Concept of Time of Abu'l-Barakāt

On the basis of two kinds of theories on time, those of Ibn Sīnā and Ghazālī, Abu'l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī, who was a contemporary of Ghazālī and was called 'the unique man of the period' (awḥad al-Zamān), developed his peculiar tempology.

Abu'l-Barakāt discusses his theory on time both physically and metaphysically in his main work, 'Kitāb al-Mu'tabar' (the Book of What Has Been Established by Personal Reflection).⁵⁷

In the 'Physics', Abu'l-Barakāt observes time and says:

What we have to know about time is that time is related to measurement (taqdīr). Therefore, it is quantity (kammiyah) itself or that which possesses quantity. ⁵⁸

However, he does not discuss time in relation to movement.

Time is not what is like movement, either. ... Time is rather what is single and not pluralized, which has no relations with what occur in it. ⁵⁹

Time is rather related to existence itself.

... Time is not what 'exists' continuously. For, what has passed away has no longer existed and what is coming has not existed yet. ... This is because time is not continuous and it is always dividing itself

into the past and the future. ⁶⁰

At the same time, however, "time is not discontinuous". Thus, Abu'l-Barakāt reaches a conclusive statement:

Therefore, time is continuity concerning its quiddity (māhiyah), and it is discontinuity concerning its 'existence'. ⁶¹

Such discontinuous and existential time is named 'now' (ān), which divides time into two kinds: the past and the future, and whose collection forms temporal extension. Moreover, as 'now' is an intermediary between time and existence,

Time (zamān) comes in contact with those which are existent by 'now'. Therefore, were it not for 'now', time would not enter into existence. ⁶²

Abu'l-Barakāt does not reject the substantiality of time, for 'now' exists as substance, even though 'now' might no longer be time (zamān). Simultaneously, he rejects the substantiality of temporal extension. It is recognized as continuous changes of successive 'now's by consciousness.⁶³ In a different dimension to measure various kinds of change in time (zamān), he posits 'al-Dahr',⁶⁴ which is a sort of objective and substantial co-ordinate and is no longer time.

Thus, Abu'l-Barakāt seeks to sublate physically the theories on time of both Ibn Sīnā and Ghazālī.

Maintaining that 'now' and existence are identical as to their modes of appearance, Abu'l-Barakāt discusses the mode of time in general in relation to existence even in the physical dimension and indicates the possibility of bringing the problem of time into the metaphysical dimension.

After 'Physics', Abu'l-Barakāt discusses time metaphysically in the 'Metaphysics'.

First of all, Abu'l-Barakāt maintains the priority of time.

... The movement of all that are moving and the stationariness of all that are stationary are in and together with time. Concerning their existence, they are connected with time and they are bounded by time. However, time is not within any of them, not dependent upon their existence and not bounded by them. Therefore, time and its idea are prior to all that are known through time and with time existentially and ideally. 65

In addition, time is postulated in relation to existence.

... If it is said that time is 'the measure of existence', it is much better than being said that time is the measure of movement. It is because time is what measures even the stationariness. 66

With these two statements, Abu'l-Barakāt regards time as an object which is intuited a priori. The

apperception of time is "evidently immediate and a priori."67 Metaphysically, time is essentially prior to representation and consciousness, as in the case of existence. In other words, time is at the same level as existence, and it is connected not with movement which is an accident of existence, but rather directly with existence itself.

The physical relations between 'now' (ān) and that which is existent are expressed as the relations between time and existence metaphysically. In this sense, the metaphysical concept of time corresponds to al-Dahr as absolute co-ordinates in the physical dimension.68 Thus, time is neither a phenomenal form of perceptive representations as Ghazālī maintains, nor is it bounded in the physical dimension in which the Peripatetics neglect to refer to the fundamental mode of 'now' and the relationship between time and existence.

This immediate knowledge [of time] disposes of Aristotle's attempt to represent time as a function -- the number or the measure -- of motion. ... It follows that the doctrine of time belongs to metaphysics even more legitimately than to physics. 69

Abu'l-Barakāt is successful in finding the possibility of connecting the physical concept of time with the metaphysical dimension, transcending the

primitive cosmogony and discussing time in relation to existence. Such a peculiar manifestation as Abu'l-Barakāt's tempology should be regarded as the manifestation of the very peculiarities of Islamic thought itself. It is better now to proceed to elucidating the characteristics of Islamic thought concerning existence, that is to say, the Islamic ontological Weltanschauung.

(b) The Ontological Weltanschauung of Islam

As we have observed above, according to Abu'l-Barakāt, existence and time in its metaphysical meaning manifest themselves directly to intuition a priori, and in this sense, consciousness is constructed 'now' which is as existentialized time.

' Whether it is perceived or not, it [the existent] keeps an existent. ... Thus, perception is not a condition for existence, but existence is the very condition for perception. 70

Furthermore,

It is impossible to exclude time in consciousness, as it is impossible to exclude existence. 71

Thus, the formation and actualization of consciousness as the subject of perception cannot be possible without

existence and existential time. Additionally, insofar as time is the measure of existence, existence is the sole fundamental condition for the cognition of all representations.

Under such understanding, it is quite natural and necessary to accept the Islamic developing mode of the world that existents are manifested as the actualization of the absolutely unarticulated existence.

On the contrary, in the western cognitive way,

The reason why those who are staying in the dimension of superficial consciousness cannot accept the absolutely unarticulated 'existence' but 'suffocatively' is that they stick to grasp the unarticulated 'existence' as an intentional object of 'the consciousness of ...' and additionally, as it is directly manifested. 72

In other words, the relations between existence and consciousness in western thought are the reverse of those in Islamic thought. Even the modern existentialists are not free from this western tradition. 73

The ordinary way of thinking in the western context can be symbolically called 'essentialism'.

The first, essentialism, is a philosophical elaboration or extension of our ordinary common-sense view of things. ... In this view, it is the quiddities that exist,

while "existence" is but an attribute or property of the quiddities. 74

Under the tradition of Christian Scholastic philosophy, existent(ens) and existence(esse) are strictly distinguished. Human reason recognizes the phenomenal existents first of all, then defines their essence (essentia), and finally confirms their existence in accordance with essence.⁷⁵ Modern existentialism, too, such as that of Heidegger, seems to have followed on from this tradition.⁷⁶ Thus, the essence of things acts the most importantly and indispensably to posit existent and existence and distinguish between them.

Moreover, in Christian Scholasticism, "The metaphysical order of the realities is the reverse of the cognitive order of human reason."

It may be said that the disunion between epistemology and ontology has been caused in the western thought since then, because the order of the realities has been left as it is the reverse of the epistemological order in the Christian Scholastic philosophy. 77

Consequently, in the essentialistic situation to separate epistemology and ontology, the epistemological tendency to recognize the essence of things as its central object seems to have characterized western thought in general.

It cannot be denied that epistemological

essentialism implies the tendency toward psychologism. In fact, in the history of western thought, ontology in the metaphysical context has been suspended, in spite of the fact that Aristotelian metaphysics postulated ontology as its intrinsic theme. Metaphysics even has a contemptible connotation today, and such a situation of disunion between physics and metaphysics has brought many problems concerning the alienation of human beings.

With regard to Islamic thought, such disunion never occurs and the ontological approach toward existence is necessarily the central theme.

To the contrary, in the spiritual tradition of the East, at least in principle, people are not expelled to 'suffocation' in such a case [that they confront the unarticulated existence]. For, the preparation has been completed in order not to be frightened in facing the absolute unarticulated 'existence'. 78

In the Islamic tradition, existence is self-evident and transcends definition. All existents and their essence and quiddity depend upon existence, which is pre-defined, or unarticulated.

The concept of existence is self-evident and it can be an object of reason in itself without any other intermediaries. For, because of the necessary fact that the object to be defined is more self-evident and manifest than those who will define it, there is no one who will define or elucidate

existence. 79

Existents are the actuality of existence. The articulated phase of absolute unarticulated existence is the phenomenal existents, and in this sense, it is noticeable that the Arabic word 'hadd', which means a boundary line, indicates 'definition' as well.⁸⁰

Moreover, Islam has "the axial and central doctrine of unity(al-tawhīd)⁸¹ as one of the main constituents of 'religion'(dīn), which are, īmān, islām, tawhīd and ma'rifah. All the activities of Islam are inevitably related to this doctrine of tawhīd and Iṣlāmī people keep seeking the way to achieve tawhīd. The doctrine of tawhīd is generally and basically interpreted as the 'Unity of God'. In the Qur'ān,

I have not created jinn and mankind
except to serve Me. ⁸²

And,

Say: 'He is God, One,
God, the Everlasting Refuge,
who has not begotten, and has not
been begotten,
and equal to Him is not any one.' ⁸³

Therefore, under the doctrine of tawhīd, man must seek, recognize and be aware of the signs(āyah) of the manifestation and Revelation of God in the phenomenal

existing world.

Thus, as it is based upon these two principles, that is, 'existence'(wujūd) and 'tawhīd', Islam has developed its peculiar ontological Weltanschauung in their combination. This view is symbolized with the following two themes: the Unity of Existence(wahdah al-wujūd) and the fundamental reality of existence(asālah al-wujūd).

The school of 'the Unity of Existence'(wahdah al-wujūd), which was founded by Ibn 'Arabī, has developed especially in Shī'ism(geographically, in Persia, or Iran). This school reached one of its summits at Mullā Sadrā and has succeeded as a main stream of Islamic thought until today, represented by Sabzawārī and 'Allāmah Tabātabā'ī, for example.

First of all, let us ask the perspective of 'existence'.

In the traditional Islamic philosophy, 'existence' (wujūd = esse or existentia) and 'existent' (mawjūd = ens) are not distinguished so manifestly as in the case of the Christian Scholastic philosophy which speculates in Latin. ... In Islamic philosophy, the way is sought to make the cognitive order coincide with the order of realities. ⁸⁴

With such linguistic characteristics peculiar to Arabic, it has become possible to make the order of realities coincidental with the cognitive mode of the phenomenal existents. In other words, existent (mawjūd) is the actuality of existence (wujūd) and they cannot be postulated separately from each other at all.

As we can find exemplification in the argument by Abu'l-Barakāt, concerning the relations between existence and consciousness, existence is primordially prior to consciousness in any dimension. That is to say, consciousness as the subject of recognition in general is conditioned by existence and the reverse is not possible. In addition, if we do not neglect the inseparability of existence from existents, it can be said that this Islamic order concerning realities and recognition is phenomenological in its radical sense.

Furthermore, in Islamic thought, existence and consciousness are united and integrated ultimately in the mode of 'mental existence' -- conscious existence and existential consciousness -- (al-wujūd al-dhihnī). In this existential mode, existence conditions consciousness and consciousness is identified with existence. Thus, it is possible in Islamic thought to integrate epistemology and ontology.

Existence is also discussed in relation to quiddity (māhīyah), and almost all the Islamic philosophers generally maintain the fundamental reality of existence (asālah al-wujūd).⁸⁵

Concerning the relations between existence and quiddity,

'Quiddity' appears at the turning point of 'existence' from the metaphysical dimension to the physical dimension.⁸⁶

In the western context, quiddity acts indispensably between existence and existents for the postulation of existents as articulated existence. This accentuation of the indispensability of quiddity makes it possible to separate existents from existence and suspend existence in the transcendent and disunited dimension. Thus, existents have been discussed only in relation to quiddity in the western context.

In Islamic philosophy, on the contrary, existence (wujūd) and existent (mawjūd) are related directly in any case and quiddity cannot disunite existents from existence.

The distinction between quiddity and existence is possible exclusively "at the level of conceptual analysis".⁸⁷ "Quiddity and existence can be clearly distinguished in the realm of rational speculation."⁸⁸

Solely at the rational level, the concept of quiddity obtains its own positivity and 'the accidentality of existence' to quiddity is justified.

Reason separates quiddity -- that is, what is explained in the answer to the question of what it is -- from existence. Then, reason adds existence to quiddity. That is to say, this is the meaning of the accidentality of existence. 89

However, in the Islamic Weltanschauung, rational speculation cannot implicate the whole phase of the Divine and Created world. Thus, the methodology to posit existence on the basis of quiddity and human reason itself are bounded and relativized.

At the real(or "pre-conceptual") level, "what is really real is existence, and existence only."90

* The truth is the doctrine of the fundamental reality of existence(asālah al-wujūd) which the Islamic Peripatetics maintain. 91

At the actual level, quiddity is the articulation and definition of existence and existence is prior to any definition as discussed above. When existence is articulated and actualized as existents, quiddity is manifested conceptually and accidentally. In this sense,

Existence is existent in itself, and quiddity is existent accidentally. 92

Therefore, in reality, existence is the sole fundamental reality and existence is prior to quiddity. Quiddity cannot be independent of existence in actuality and neither can existents be independent of existence.

Notes

- 1 Harry Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalam, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), p.1.
- 2 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islamic Life and Thought, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1981), p. 60.
- 3 Nasr, Islamic Life and Thought, p. 60.
- 4 Nasr, Islamic Life and Thought, p. 60.
- 5 Toshihiko Izutsu, Islam-Shisōshi (History of Islamic Thought), (Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten, 1975), p. 40.
- 6 Ignaz Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, trans. Andras and Ruth Hamori, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 87.
- 7 Goldziher, pp. 85-86.
- 8 Nasr, Islamic Life and Thought, p. 60.
- 9 Nasr, Islamic Life and Thought, p. 61.
- 10 In the Qur'ān,
"It is He who created for you all that is in the earth, then he lifted Himself to heaven and levelled them seven heavens; and He has knowledge of everything." (2: 27)
- 11 Izutsu, Islam-Shisōshi, p. 267.
- 12 See, Izutsu, Islam-Shisōshi, p. 268.
- 13 Ghazālī, Tahāfut al-Falāsifat, ed. M. Bouyges, (Beirut, 1962), p. 68. See, Akiro Matsumoto, "Abu'l-Barakāt no Jikanron ni tsuite" (On the Time-theory of Abu'l-Barakāt), in Chūsei Shisōshi Kenkyū (Studies in Medieval Thought), (Tokyo: Chusei Tetsugakkai, 1978), p. 23.
- 14 Matsumoto, "Abu'l-Barakāt", p. 23.
- 15 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 14.

- 16 See, W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1979), p. 41.
- 17 See, Watt, p. 41, and Izutsu, Islam-Shisōshi, pp. 191-194.
- 18 Aristotle, Physics, trans. P. H. Wicksteed and F. M. Cornford, (2 vols, Loeb Classical Library, London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1929 & 1934), 252 a.
- 19 Aristotle, Physics, 258 b.
- 20 Ian Richard Netton, Muslim Neoplatonists, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1982), p. 31.
- 21 Netton, p. 52.
- 22 Netton, p. 27.
- 23 Nasr, An Introduction, p. 63.
- 24 Nasr, An Introduction, p. 64.
- 25 Nasr, An Introduction, p. 63. Nasr quotes the Rasā'il, II-15:
"Time is a pure form, an abstract notion, simple and intelligible, elaborated in the soul by the faculties of the spirit. It is born there through meditation upon the regular repetition of nights and days around the earth and resembles the generation of numbers by the repetition of One." (p. 63.)
- 26 Netton, p. 38.
- 27 Nasr, An Introduction, p. 65.
- 28 As for the details, see, for example, A. M. Goichon, The Philosophy of Avicenna, trans. M. S. Khan, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1969), p. 4.
- 29 See, Izutsu, Islam-Shisōshi, pp. 235-237.
- 30 Goichon, p. 11. See, Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. H. Tredennick, (2 vols, Loeb Classical Library, London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1933 & 1935), Book IV-1, 1003 a.
- 31 Nasr, An Introduction, p. 225.

32 Ibn Sīnā, "Fann-i samā'-i tabī'ī", in Al-Shifā', (Tehran, 1937), See, Nasr, An Introduction, p. 225.

33 Ibn Sīnā, Najāt, (Paris, 1900), p. 31. See, Nasr, Islamic Life and Thought, p. 89.

34 Ibn Sīnā, Kitāb al-Ishārāt, ed. S. Dunyā, (Cairo, 1960), Vol. III, pp. 504-506. See, Matsumoto, "Abu'l-Barakāt", pp. 21-22.

35 Nasr, An Introduction, p. 225.

36 This is a commentary by Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī to Ibn Sīnā, al-Ishārāt, pp. 504-506. See, Matsumoto, "Abu'l-Barakāt", p. 22.

37 See, Goichon, p. 24.

38 Nasr, An Introduction, p. 182.

39 Nasr, An Introduction, p. 183.

40 Nasr, Islamic Life and Thought, p. 72.

41 See, Watt, chapter 15, or, Nasr, Islamic Life and Thought, p. 72.

42 See, Ibn Rushd, Averroes' Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), trans. Simon Van Den Bergh, (2 vols, London: Messrs. Luzac & Co, 1954), pp. 1-69, The First Discussion. As for the time-theory of Ibn Rushd, see, Izutsu, Islam-Shisōshi, pp. 309-313.

43 Ibn Rushd, Discourse on the Manner of the World's Existence, 69. 12-15. See, Barry S. Kogan, "Eternity and Origination: Averroes' Discourse on the Manner of the World's Existence", in Islamic Theology and Philosophy, ed. M. E. Marmura, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), p. 228.

44 Ibn Rushd, Discourse, 67. 15. See, Kogan, p. 208.

45 Kogan, p. 212.

46 See, Kogan, p. 203, and Izutsu, Islam-Shisōshi, p. 310.

47 The discussion on this subject here mostly depends upon the Persian essay by Fāzel Tūnī, "Qidam wa

Hudūth"(Pre-eternity and Contingency), in Hikmat-e Qadīm, (Tehran, 1952), pp. 47-51.

48 In this context, the terms, 'precedingness' and 'precededness' do not necessarily belong to the temporal concepts.

49 This kind of development can be found in the thoughts of Mullā Sadrā and Sabzawārī, for example.

50 This discussion is basically dependent upon the Persian essay by Jalāl al-Dīn Homā'ī, "Tajaddud-e Amthāl wa Harakat-e Jowharī"(The Renewal of Creation and the Concept of Substantial Motion), in Sophia Perennis(The Bulletin of the Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy), Vol. III, No. 1, Spring, 1977, pp. 1-24.

51 Nasr says:

"Shi'ite theology, however, took the opposite direction from Ash'arism and became more and more sympathetic to gnosis(al-ma'rifah or 'irfān) and theosophy(al-hikmah), while Ash'arism became the arch-opponent of philosophy(falsafah) ..."(Nasr, Islamic Life and Thought, p. 61.)

According to Homā'ī, philosophers firstly depend upon rational arguments, and then, believe religiously. Therefore, their argumentation is necessarily restricted in the rational realm. On the other hand, theologians believe religiously first of all, and then, seek rational arguments. Thus, they often tend to negate things which are self-evident sensorily. On the contrary, theosophers discuss by 'seeing'(az dīda), or by innate intuition.

The twelve-Imam Shi'ite learned have sought the way to harmonize religion(dīn) with philosophy, like the Ikhwān al-Safā. They refrain(epochē) from any further theological and philosophical arguments and discuss the problems theosophically.

See Homā'ī, pp. 2-3.

52 'Tajaddud-e amthāl' is translated as 'renewal of creation' in the index of this quoted book. However, 'amthāl' means resemblances or likenesses, which implies what keeps its identity as changing and intermitting every moment.

53 Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, The Mathnawī, ed. R. A. Nicholson, (London: Messrs. Luzac & Co, 1926), Vol. II, p. 64, Book I, 1144-1146. See, Homā'ī, p. 1.

54 Shabistarī, Gulshan-e Rāz. See, Homā'ī, p. 4.

55 The Qur'ān, 35: 16-18.

56 The Qur'ān, 56: 61.

57 This translation of the name of the book is by Shlomo Pines. See, S. Pines, Studies in Abu'l-Barakāt Al-Baghdādī -- Physics and Metaphysics, (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1979), p. 262.

58 Abu'l-Barakāt, "Physics", in Kitāb al-Mu'tabar, (Haydarābād, 1979), pp. 77-78. See, Matsumoto, "Abu'l-Barakāt", p. 24-25.

59 Abu'l-Barakāt, "Physics", pp. 77-78.

60 Abu'l-Barakāt, "Physics", pp. 77-78.

61 Abu'l-Barakāt, "Physics", pp. 77-78.

62 Abu'l-Barakāt, "Physics", p. 79. See, Matsumoto, "Abu'l-Barakāt", p. 26.

63 Admittedly, in Islamic thought, consciousness is identical to existence ultimately as mental existence -- conscious existence and existential consciousness -- (al-wujūd al-dhihnī). I will discuss al-wujūd al-dhihnī later.

64 Generally speaking, in Islamic philosophy, the modes of emanating and becoming are classified into three: zamān, dahr and sarmad. Zamān is the relationship of changeable things with one another, which corresponds to 'time' in the physical dimension. Dahr is the relationship between that which is stable and unchangeable and changeable things, which is the relationship between God and the creatures. Sarmad is the relationship of those which are stable and unchangeable with one another, which corresponds to the relationship between God and the attributes of God. See, Matsumoto, "Abu'l-Barakāt", p. 34, note 14.

Homā'ī explains as follows:

"1. Zamān: According to the terms of philosophers, it is the vessel of relationship (zarf-e nisbat) among what are changeable (mutaghayyir) with one another, like the relations among daily accidents and what exist today and existed yesterday with one another.

2. Dahr: It is the vessel of relationship of what are changeable to what are constant (thābit), like the relations between what are changeable temporally and what are stable eternally. ...

3 Sarmad: It is the vessel of relationship of what are stable to what are stable, like the relations among the name and the attributes of God with one another. Therefore, it is said that 'sarmad' is the spirit of 'dahr'. Similarly, 'dahr' is the spirit of 'zamān'." (Homā'ī, p. 18.)

On the other hand, it should be noticed that the pre-Islamic Arabs had a peculiar view of life which is called 'Dahriyah' (the faith to Dahr).

"In the Jahili system, too, man was considered to owe his being and existence to the creative activity of Allāh. But there is here an extremely interesting point to note. Man, once created by Allāh, severs his ties, so to speak, with his Creator, and his existence on earth is, from that time on, put into the hands of another, far more powerful, Master. And the tyrannical sway of this Master continues till the very moment of his death, which is nothing but the culmination of the tyranny and oppression under which he has been groaning through all his life. The name of this tyrannical Sovereign is Dahr 'Time'." (Toshihiko Izutsu, God and Man in the Koran, Tokyo: The Keio Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies, 1964, p. 124.)

To such a faith to Dahr, in the Qur'ān,

"They say,

'There is nothing but our present life; we die, and we live, and nothing but Time [Dahr] destroys us.' Of that they have no knowledge; they merely conjecture." (45: 23)

Thus, Islam had absorbed negatively the concept of dahr and transformed it to the philosophical terminology.

65 Abu'l-Barakāt, "Metaphysics", in Kitāb al-Mu'tabar, pp. 39-40. See, Matsumoto, "Abu'l-Barakāt", pp. 28-29.

66 Abu'l-Barakāt, "Metaphysics", pp. 39-40.

67 Pines, p. 289.

68 Abu'l-Barakāt says:

"If there are people who call al-Dahr 'God',

we would not disagree to their essential and relative postulation of denomination."
("Physics", pp. 88-89.)

In this context, the following statement by S. Pines is justified.

"Abu'l-Barakāt also draws the consequences that the distinction made between time, on the one hand, and eternity and the aevum (dahr), on the other, has no justification whatever: God is not beyond time." (Pines, p. 267.)

69 Pines, p. 266.

70 Abu'l-Barakāt, "Metaphysics", pp. 20-21.

71 Abu'l-Barakāt, "Metaphysics", pp. 39-40.

72 Toshihiko Izutsu, Ishiki to Honshitsu (Consciousness and Essence), (Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten, 1983), p. 11.

73 As for the 'suffocation' described by Sartre, see, Izutsu, Ishiki to Honshitsu, pp. 6-12.

74 Toshihiko Izutsu, "An Analysis of Wahdat al-Wujūd -- Toward a Metaphilosophy of Oriental Philosophies", in The Concept and Reality of Existence, (Tokyo: The Keio Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies, 1971), p. 41.

75 See, Akirō Matsumoto, "Revolution and Ontology -- A Study of 'The Beginning of Philosophy' by 'Allāmah Tabātabā'ī", in Bulletin of the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. I, (Niigata, The Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, International University of Japan, 1985), p. 32.

76 Izutsu says:

"... Heidegger in our days reproaches openly and with great emphasis the whole ontological tradition of the West for having been exclusively concerned with 'that-which-is', das Seiende, maujūd, totally forgetting the crucial importance to be attached to the small verb is which appears in the phrase 'that-which-is'. What should be the central theme of ontology, he argues, is not 'that-which-is' but rather the verb 'is', das Sein, which forms seemingly quite an insignificant part of this phrase."

See, T. Izutsu, "Existentialism East and West", in The Concept and Reality of Existence, pp. 27-28.

77 Matsumoto, "Revolution and Ontology", p. 33.

78 Izutsu, Ishiki to Honshitsu, p. 12. According to Izutsu's interpretation, eastern thought includes Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, etc. I do not necessarily agree with this point of view, but at least, this description quoted here also seems to be justified concerning Islamic thought.

79 'Allāmah Tabātabā'ī, Bidāyah al-Hikmah (The Beginning of Philosophy), (Qum: Makatabah al-Tabatabai, 1976), p. 7. See, Matsumoto, "Revolution and Ontology", p. 32.

80 See, Izutsu, Ishiki to Honshitsu, pp. 27-30.

81 Nasr, Islamic Life and Thought, p. 57.

82 The Qur'ān, 51: 56.

83 The Qur'ān, 112.

84 Matsumoto, "Revolution and Ontology", pp. 32-33. This indication by Matsumoto is sharply opposed to the argument of Izutsu. According to Izutsu, the methodology to distinguish between existence and existent and discuss existence separately is called 'existentialism', and in regard to existentialism, Izutsu finds universal similarity among modern western existentialism, Islamic thought and other eastern thoughts in general. However, on the contrary, according to Matsumoto, western existentialism and Islamic thought are quite different to each other and the peculiarity of Islamic thought is emphasized. I adopt the latter assertion and this is the reason why I do not use the term 'existentialism' to express Islamic thought as the opposite concept of essentialism, but use the term 'ontological Weltanschauung'. See, Izutsu, "Existentialism East and West", pp. 25-33.

85 See, Matsumoto, "Revolution and Ontology", p. 38.

86 Izutsu, Ishiki to Honshitsu, pp. 9-10.

87 Izutsu, "Existentialism East and West", p. 29.

88 Matsumoto, "Revolution and Ontology", p. 37.

89 Tabātabā'ī, Bidāyah, p. 9. See, Matsumoto, "Revolution and Ontology", p. 36.

90 Izutsu, "Existentialism East and West", p. 29.

91 Tabātabā'ī, Bidāyah, pp. 10-12. See, Matsumoto, "Revolution and Ontology", p. 39.

92 Tabātabā'ī, Bidāyah, pp. 10-12. See, Matsumoto, "Revolution and Ontology", p. 41.

IV

Practical Manifestations of the Islamic Weltanschauung

The Islamic Weltanschauung is ontological and is based upon the doctrine of 'tawhīd', as discussed hitherto. It will not remain in the purely idealistic dimension, in accordance with its own innate logic to demand the totality and integrity of the universe. The Islamic Weltanschauung manifests itself concretely and practically in all the phases of this phenomenal world, including human beings and their activities. Otherwise, it falls into self-contradiction and self-destruction because of its necessary requirement to unite the universe. Let us scrutinize several reflections of this Weltanschauung upon human intellectual and practical activities in order to clarify its universality and possibility of manifestation. For this purpose, modern Iranian intellectual activities are investigated as a case study to exemplify the concrete manifestation of the Islamic Weltanschauung, because the Islamic Revolution of Iran can be regarded as its typical and symbolical manifestation in the modern period.¹

1. Penetration of Revelation to Human Reason('aql)

(a) Concrete Implication of the Weltanschauung

Islam keeps its intentionality toward integrity, totality and universality through the doctrine of 'tawhīd', under which the world as a whole is fundamentally unified and integrated. Islam intends to be total religion and transcend religion itself. Islam in itself should rather be called the wholistic 'Weltanschauung'(jahānbīnī). At this point, the dynamics and inherent negativity of Islam in its positive sense are proved in the intentional process toward God.

Man, in the state of pure nature, perceives through his God-given primordial nature that the vast realm of the universe, from the minutest particle to the greatest galaxies with their wonderful system of precise laws, points to its origin from the One God. He clearly perceives that all things have come into existence by His act of creation; ... 2

If it is supposed that we can divide the universe into two, into the phenomenal and essential aspect, the spiritual and material aspect, or the mental and existential aspect, Islam always intends to implicate and unify both aspects.

According to such a radical and strict attitude toward the universe as a whole, the Islamic thinkers

can legitimately criticize the tendency of western thinking.

... the Western thinkers consider religion to be simply a social phenomenon, a result of a series of physical factors, like society itself.

Those Western thinkers who were rather optimistic regarding religion -- including Islam -- say that it is the mental contrivance of a group of men of genius, ...3

It is evident that this kind of judgement of western thinkers is completely refuted by Islamic thinkers. Islam is the Revelation by God, not a phenomenal affair. From such understanding, it can be declared that "Islam is alive by all means"4, and therefore, Islam is radical and fundamental in its nature.5

Furthermore, the Islamic ontological Weltanschauung does not distinguish clearly between existence (wujūd) and existents(mawjūd).6 Then, it is considered that the existents of the world are the signs(āyah) of the Existence and Will of God and that each existent possesses its own existence and reality.

In the opinion of the Islamic philosophers, especially Mullā Sadrā, what possesses reality is pure being, and the determined and manifested beings derive their reality from pure being. 7

Thus, when the phenomenal world is understood on the basis of its ontological existence, the horizon can be

developed on which observing the world totally and harmoniously becomes possible.

Western thought, on the contrary, begins its development on the basis of epistemological essence or quiddity from which the existence of the world is inferred and postulated. The negative aspect of this tendency can be called 'psychologism'.⁸ For instance,

In Hegel's view, therefore, pure being cannot be real, and being becomes a reality through synthesis with non-being.⁹

Under such psychologism, the world is interpreted as being dynamic between 'these' and 'anti-these'. In the human intellectual realm, too, religion and philosophy are necessarily separated and put into opposition. Since it is thought that the world is totally in contradiction, the way is sought to synthesize the contradictions, such as through dialectical methodology.

Under the Islamic Weltanschauung, the universe and the world are intrinsically harmonious, although the phenomenal world appears diverse and in contradiction.

The "natural man" perceives that this world of existence, with all its scattered fragments, is itself a huge unified whole in which all parts are interrelated with one another. Everything is linked with other things, and a perfect harmony and unity prevails amongst them.¹⁰

Hence, the intrinsic total harmony which integrates all the phenomenal contradictions is posited in advance in Islam. When we follow this outlook of the world, the possibility can be obtained of solving the alienation of each existent from the external world and uniting the divided sciences of the human intellect which have been mutually excluded.

(b) Relativity and Intentionality of Human Reason

In the western tradition, human reason is the central subjectivity which behaves as if it were completely free from any other restrictions and omniscient. The world is regarded as the psychologistic product of human reason and it is thought that the world can be interpreted as desired, sometimes arbitrarily, by human reason.

In opposition, in accordance with the Islamic Weltanschauung, even the phenomenal world is independent of human reason and psychology and is the revealed sign of God as the Absolute Existence (al-wujūd al-mutlaq). In the Qur'ān:

And Allah has brought you forth from the wombs of your mothers -- you did not know anything -- and He gave you the hearing and the sight and the hearts ...¹¹

Even human reason itself is created by God. Thus, human reason is also relativized and cannot be the ultimate and independent subjectivity. Reason is one of the methods of inquiring into the Revelation of God.

The goal must possess a reality beyond imagination and assumption. One cannot assume something for himself as a goal, and then think it to be real. The value of an assumed thing is only within the limit of its being a means and a tool. Therefore, it is an illusion to say that man creates his own values. 12

It is stated in the Qur'ān,

... And you are not given aught of knowledge but little. 13

Thus,

We think that the goal is truth, that is, God. Islamic monotheism can only have this meaning. 14

None of 'heaven, wisdom, justice, love and faith'15 themselves can be the ultimate goal of human life in Islam.

However, human reason does not necessarily oppose the faith of the Revelation. It is rather a necessary attribute of human beings in order to understand and believe the genuine meaning of the Revelation.

Rather, they [human beings] possess an instinct for research and discovering the truth, ... human beings intrinsically turn away from ignorance towards knowledge and learning, ... 16

The authority of human reason is given by the Qur'ān. The Qur'ān is revealed with "the language of rational argument and the language of feeling", and the rational language "addresses and appeals to the intellect or reason".17 Thus, reason and its usage are positively authorized and necessitated. In the Qur'ān,

Surely the worst of beasts in God's sight are those that are deaf and dumb and do not reason. 18

The rational and intellectual activities of human beings and their emotional activities are not contradictory, but complementary and harmonious under the basic doctrine of Islam and the omnipotence of God as the Creator. Both seek the Divine Will cooperatively and praise His Revelation.

2. Integral Direction of Wissenschaft('ilm)

In accordance with this outlook on the world peculiar to Islam, the Islamic mode of human intellectual activities is necessarily differentiated from that of the West and others. As human reason and emotions are harmoniously unified for religion(dīn),

human intellect on the basis of reason and faith in the Revelation can be co-existent and integrated under the doctrine of tawhīd.

A follower of the Islamic religion must first accept the testimony of faith: "There is no god but God" (lā ilāha illa-llāh). This profession of God's Unity is Islam's first pillar (rukṇ). All else depends upon it and derives from it.

... Theology, jurisprudence, philosophy, Sufism, even to some degree the natural sciences, all seek to explain at some level the principle of tawhīd, "To profess that God is One." 19

It should be mentioned that human intellect is implicated in Islam as total *Weltanschauung* and that it is utilized as one of the methods of reaching the hidden truth of the Revelation of God.

With such understanding, the connotation of the word 'ilm does not correspond to the English words, knowledge or science, without some semantic discrepancy. 'Ilm cannot be divided into several independent realms. 'Ilm cannot be plural as sciences can.

The word 'ilm(knowledge or science), like the word "existence"(wujūd) has a broad range of meanings which vary from the viewpoints of strength or weakness, perfection or deficiency. The word's generic sense covers this whole spectrum of meaning in which it has been used in the prophetic tradition. This broad sense of the word 'ilm is common to all its varied meanings. 20

Thus, knowledge and sciences at the level of human intellect are included in 'ilm which maintains a broader sphere.²¹ In that sense, 'ilm, or *Wissenschaft*, becomes connected and interrelated with 'irfān, or gnosis. Furthermore, in the methodological aspect of *Wissenschaft*, 'ilm is based upon the ontological *Weltanschauung*, and ontology and epistemology interpenetrate one another.

It should be recognized here that there exist two paradoxes: the one is that the epistemological method produces secular or physical knowledge or sciences as it is based upon essence or quiddity and that it infers the mode of existence from them. The other is that the ontological approach is connected with metaphysics and cosmology in which essence or quiddity are abstracted in the relations between existence and existents. In other words, the investigation of existents (mawjūd) is identified with the metaphysical elucidation of existence (wujūd) in the Islamic ontological way, while the western epistemological way of thinking has flourished in the realm of physics or natural sciences. Thus, Islamic thinkers have sought the Divine Will with innate ontological intuition as they have accepted the limited validity of the epistemological deduction of existence from quiddity.

In the intellectual construction of the structure of the world in Islamic Wissenschaft, the epistemological method is structurally identical with the ontological way, and both are developed on the basis of the reality of existence, not of quiddity, under the unity of existence(wahdah al-wujūd).

Then, in the various intellectual inquiries, it is impossible to segment the existence of human beings into several phenomenal aspects in Islamic thought. Their existence manifests itself in totality and wholeness.

Man is a cultural being. Many thinkers regard man as an economic being more than anything else, and thus base all estimations on this judgement. Actually man is a cultural being.

... The morality and behaviour of every individual are manifestation and expression of the collective entity which is culture. It is the sum-total of our outlook, behaviour and norms.

... As Muslims, we believe that this physical and phenomenal world is the manifestation of the Creator of nature and matter.

... It is God who is the reality of being and the meaning of existence. Everything is meaningful only in the light of God's existence. 22

Thus, as the Islamic Weltanschauung itself negates and transcends the dualism of the sacred and the profane, Wissenschaft inherently transcends and implicates the physical dimension.

According to this fundamental structure of the Islamic mode of Wissenschaft, the branches of human intellectual activities, that is, the sciences, are connected with one another and unified.

Islamic philosophy also possesses a unified vision of things -- that is, a view of the interrelation between all realms of knowledge. However dangerous the separative tendency(or sclerosis as some call it) of the modern sciences may be for the West, it is doubly fatal for Islam, whose sole raison d'être is to assert the doctrine of unity (al-tawhīd) and to apply it to every aspect of life. 23

In the metaphysical dimension, for example, four ways are usually maintained to reach the divine truth, that is, Peripatetic philosophy(hikmat-i mashā'), philosophy of emanation(hikmat-i 'ishrāq), kalām and 'irfān.²⁴ Under the doctrine of tawhīd, these are not contradictory, but complementary with one another. Here can be found the reason why 'irfān(gnosis) and sūfism(tasawwuf) participate indispensably in the establishment of the Islamic mode of Wissenschaft.²⁵

In the case of Islam, 'philosophy' should be interpreted as the most generic term which expresses the general mode of Wissenschaft implicating both metaphysics and physics. Therefore, one of the aims of Islamic philosophy(hikmat) is "to reconcile revelation with reason, knowledge with faith, and religion with

philosophy, and to show that reason and revelation do not contradict each other".²⁶

In addition, it is not necessary to mention that physics, or the natural sciences are also subordinate to this fundamental standpoint of Islam, and that they cannot be separated and independent from Islamic metaphysics and cosmology.

Even when it is recognized that Islamic Wissenschaft is thoroughly open to every direction, another peculiarity should be emphasized: that is, the direction to which Wissenschaft must intend, or the intentionality.

... half of human pains find no remedy except through science. But man has other pains which constitute his 'human' suffering, the suffering which relates to his human dimension. Here science provides no help, and the scientists, when they reach this point, declare that science is neutral and indifferent; it is a means and it does not prescribe any goal for mankind. Science does not elevate human objectives, and does not provide a direction. Rather, it must be said that man uses science as an aid in the direction which he selects in life. ²⁷

It should be noticed carefully at this point that the recognition of the boundary of sciences does not result in the opposition between sciences and religion. Islam as total Weltanschauung provides the direction in which sciences should follow, as it implicates all the sciences of the human intellect and keeps them in

harmony. Then, in the broader perspective, the Islamic doctrines which constitute the Weltanschauung provide the direction, or the intentionality, of the goal of human life in general. Therefore, we should again remember the statement of Mutahhari, "The goal is truth, that is, God."²⁸

3. Intentional Manifestation of History

The Islamic outlook on history necessarily reflects the Weltanschauung peculiar to Islam.

According to Mutahhari, there are three disciplines concerning history: "Traditional history" is "the knowledge of the bygone incidents, events, conditions and circumstances of the people in the past" and "the knowledge of 'being'". "Scientific history" is "the knowledge of laws" and also "the knowledge of 'being'". On the Contrary, the "philosophy of history" is "the science of 'becoming' of societies, not of their 'being' only".²⁹ However, the philosophy of becoming is intrinsically dependent upon the knowledge of being, which is completely different from the western relationship between being and becoming, such as in Hegelian philosophy of history. In the general understanding in Islamic thought, 'being', or existence, is the sole reality and 'becoming' is a

changing situation of existence or the relationship between being and non-being. Therefore, becoming cannot be real and it is conceptual. When history is constructed on the "principality of existence (asālah al-wujūd)",³⁰ it becomes possible to develop history ontologically.

... philosophy of history is the study of a continuous stream which originated in the past and continues to flow towards the future. Time, for the sake of study of these types of problems, cannot be assumed to be merely a container [occupied by historical reality], but it is to be regarded as one of the dimensions of this reality.³¹

As time is discussed ontologically, diachronical history is similarly constructed as reality and it is an object of ontological argument on the axis of time.

When the past, present and future are postulated in the ontological dimension, the past and future and the things belonging to them obtain their own ontological positions, which transcend the present psychologistic and perceptive world at the same time when they are recognized at present. The past and future are something more than what are perceived and limited in the present.

Iron is iron. ... Wood is wood. Its reality cannot be changed, and man is unable to change it.

Therefore, granting value by creating it in the sense of giving objective reality has

no meaning.³²

The same proposition can be applied to all phenomena in the flux of time and history. This methodological attitude is phenomenological in its strict and original sense, and is free from the psychologism and centrism of the present which have given decisive influence on western thinking.³³ When history is emancipated from the psychologism and centrism of the present and the past and future manifest themselves at present as independent realities, it becomes possible to keep asking at present what are the Divine Will and the meaning of the Revelation which in reality occurred more than thirteen centuries ago.³⁴

Admittedly, in the continuous flow of time,

On the whole, there is a definite link between the present and past history of any creature. Past and present are, in fact, the two parts of an everlasting course. The past is the seed from which the present and future grow.³⁵

However, Islam "does not regard the past with total pessimism",³⁶ with the ontological postulation of the past and present. The universe in general is independent of human representations both diachronically and synchronically.

It is true that human beings are in a state of determinism under the Divine Will, such as represented

by the Creation and the Last Day. However, it should be recognized as follows:

... Predestination definitely exists as a reality but it does not restrict the freedom of a human being. 37

Human wisdom and free will are also determined and given to human beings by God. Human beings possess wisdom and free will and they must utilize them in order to ask and seek the divine decree and its genuine meaning. Certainly, there exists predestination by God, as in the relations of cause and effect at each moment, but this does not imply restriction on human beings. Rather, it indicates the way which human beings should follow in their life. The process of history predestined by God is causal at each renewed moment, and is simultaneously acausally intentional.³⁸ Thus, history, or the relationship between the past and present, is deterministic, but the present in history can be independent and develop by human will, while God maintains the continuity of history as the flow of time. Moreover, historical materialism is criticized from the point of view of the Islamic monotheistic outlook on history towards the future. Historical materialism has two premises: the first is that "the nature of history is materialistic"; the second is

that "its movements are dialectical movements".³⁹ On these two bases, it affirms the priority of matter over spirit, of material needs over intellectual needs, of action over thought, and of human sociology over human psychology.⁴⁰ Then, every aspect of human activities can be reduced to the economic base. Even culture, or human intellectual activities, "cannot develop in independence from economic development".⁴¹

However, according to Mutahharī, historical materialism lacks both experimental proofs and a priori premises. That is to say, it is baseless.⁴² Hence, as it asserts itself to be a universal principle, historical materialism cannot but fall into self-contradiction, for it is also "dependent upon a specific period."⁴³ In other words, historical materialism requires another rule or law which is more universal so that it may maintain its own validity and universality.

On the contrary, the Islamic view of history is based upon the fundamental law, and the relations between materiality and spirituality are the reverse of historical materialism.

... in our [Islamic] view, there are certain principles laid down in the Quran according to which the spiritual and intellectual foundation of society is considered prior to its material bases. 44

Mutahharī quotes the verse of the Qur'ān:

... God changes not the condition of a people until they change that which is in themselves... 45

Contrary to the assertion of historical materialism that all things in the world change and evolve to a better level (except historical materialism itself), following the analogy of biological or Darwinian evolutionism, Islam relativizes evolution, limits its applicable range and accepts the stable universal law. In the Islamic view, evolution is acquired and "only phenomena evolve." 46

Consequently, the dialectical process of history is also limited in the phenomenal dimension. There exists a more inclusive dimension, that is religion (dīn), or Islam. 47 In such a phase, the universe is totally in harmony, and man is "a microcosmic model of the entire macrocosm". 48

All Islamic ideas can be reduced to the principle of 'tawhīd'. 49 Under this principle,

The whole universe, from its beginning to the end, with all its myriads of causes and effects and all positive and negative conditions, mirrors the Divine Will. The relation of the Divine Will is the same with all causes and phenomena of the universe. 50

Thus, the diversity of the phenomenal world is always

integrated as a manifestation of the Divine Will. Although there exist many ideologies in the world, they are transient and temporal, and even "an ideology's nomenclature" ultimately disappears in Islam.

As soon as the character of this school [Islam] and that of its followers is identified, all labels and names disappear, the only thing that remains is a particular 'relationship' -- the relationship between man and God. "Islam" means submission to God. 51

4. Interpenetration of Individuals and Societies

If it is supposed that history is the diachronical axis of the manifestation of the Islamic Weltanschauung, its synchronical axis is postulated in the relationships between individuals and societies. Let us briefly inquire into the Islamic mode of individuals and societies and their peculiar relations.

Although human individuals possess their own life and real existence in a certain period, they cannot exist separately and independently from certain 'relations', such as between individuals, between individuals and society, and ultimately between individuals and God. Even the "natural man" or "the natural structure of the human being and the conditions of a common individual" 52 can be ordained only in the

relations with God.

Undeniably, there exist diversity and multiplicity among human individuals.

God has created man in diversity with different spiritual, physical, and intellectual aptitudes, dispositions, and inclinations. He has given some people special abilities, and has imparted superiority to some over others in certain talents. 53

However, essentially speaking,

Multiplicity is the product of the categories of time and space and applies only to the physical world. In the world of spirit there is nothing except unity(wahdat). 54

Moreover, "in the terminology of the 'urafā'",

Everything is a sign of God and the rays of Divine light are reflected in all beings. 55

Thus, multiplicity and unity can co-exist in different dimensions in the universe. Phenomenal affairs are intrinsically multiple and diverse, while they are manifested upon the more fundamental dimension which is in unity and harmony. Multiplicity and diversity of human individuals can be positively accepted as "the foundation of collective and social life", because:

By means of this [diversity], He has made all human beings intrinsically needful of others and inclined to associate with others. 56

Then, one vector that human individuals constitute and regulate a society is formed.

... at the higher level of synthesis, the parts usually retain a relative independence with respect to the whole. A kind of plurality in unity and unity in plurality manifests itself at higher levels of existence.

... Hence, from this point of view, we have to accept that human beings, who are the constituent parts of a society in intellectual and volitional activity, retain their individual freedom, and, therefore, their individual existence precedes their social existence. 57

Truly society is constituted as collective of human individuals, but this does not imply that society is an abstract and conceptual existence. "Society is a real compound like the natural compounds."

Collective life is not just a metaphor or an allegory, it is a reality; ... 58

In this context, the special connotation of ummah (Islamic society or community) can be understood. In the Qur'ān,

And every ummah(society) hath its term, and when its term cometh, they cannot put it off an hour nor yet advance [it]. 59

Ummah is always a reality and is not simply an imaginative figure of an ideal society which existed in the past.

Human beings cannot exist but in a certain

society, without any exception. As human beings cannot but be 'In-der-Welt-Sein' (being-in-the-world), they are beings-in-society at any time. "Man is social by nature" and "sociability is inherent in the very nature and creation of man".

... mankind is so created that it always lives in the form of groups, nations and tribes, and an individual is known through his relation to his respective nation and tribe -- an identity which is an integral part of social existence. 60

Moreover, human individuals "acquire their whole personality from society."

Individuals and personalities are nothing but expressions and manifestations of the social spirit, and in the words of Mahmūd Shabistārī, are just as "holes of a niche screen through which the social spirit emanates." 61

The personalities and peculiarities of each human individual, too, are brought out by the society to which he belongs.

With such a recognition of the indispensable sociality and gregariousness of human beings, Islam will never allow the existence of esoteric priests and the isolated mystical life.

From the Islamic point of view no esoterism bereft of life does exist. As soul once separated from body has no longer anything to

do with this world, similarly esoterism without life is not a thing of this world. It is absurd to talk of esoterism minus life. 62

Everyone is and must be social in order to construct a society(ummah). Thus, everyone can possess absolute equality before God.

Hence, another vector can exist here, that society manifests and prescribes the existence of human individuals.

Then, society and human individuals are co-related and interpenetrative. Their relations must always be bilateral in the Islamic synchronical outlook on the world. In other words, more generally speaking, each existent at a different level possesses its own independent reality, and all interpenetrate one another at any time as they are co-related and inter-related.

One of the most typical representations of the Islamic relations between society and human individuals is manifested in worship(salāt). Though salāt is the strictly individual religious activity of human beings, it is simultaneously one of the social activities of human beings.

Recently, there has been considerable argument on the problem of alienation, which is peculiar to western societies.

The main criticism projected towards the Western culture by the world's intellectuals is that it is a world-conscious culture which bends towards self-oblivion. Within this culture, man comes to merely know the world. The more he attains an awareness of the world, the more he forgets about his own being. 63

Western culture has separated society and human individuals and recognizes only the unilateral relations from society to human individuals. Under its materialistic outlook on the world, those relations have been recognized solely as alienation from society. In the situation that the possibility of actions by human individuals towards society was neglected, the mode of the problem has been fixed as the unilaterality of alienation of individuals from society. This fixation of the problem has brought another difficulty, that is, the self-alienation of human beings. Alienation from society makes all the relations which human beings possess uncertain and segmented, which necessarily results in the self-oblivion that is called self-alienation. Western thinkers have neglected the possibility that the postulation of problems itself is wrong, which seems consequent upon the present sociological and philosophical aporia.

On the other hand, according to the Islamic Weltanschauung discussed hitherto, a possibility of overcoming the difficulties which the West is

confronting may be developed. In the Islamic view, a society and human individuals are related to each other bilaterally and interpenetratively as each is an independent reality. Such an interrelated mode of existence of society and human beings can possibly erase the postulation of the problem of alienation itself.

For example, "the ultimate goal of the Islamic Revolution of Iran consists in the subjugation of the self-alienation (az khod bīgānegī) which has been pervading in the modern world". 64

Ultimately, one fact has been clarified here, namely that the synchronical discussion concerning society and human beings is indispensably related to the diachronical perspective of history which retroacts until the revolution of the Prophet. The synchronical axis and the diachronical axis ontologically intersect each other at the point of the present.

Here, we conclude our discussion on society to initiate the discussion about history. 65

Islam is always seeking the way to co-develop integrally under its ontological Weltanschauung of unity, the reality of existence and the mental recognition and praxis of the existents. 66

Notes

1 Therefore, my argumentation here mainly depends upon several Iranian thinkers, such as Murtadā Mutahharī, 'Allāmah Tabātabā'ī, Sayyid Muhammad Husaynī Beheshtī.

2 'Allāmah Tabātabā'ī, "Islam and the Modern Age", in Al-Tawhīd, Vol. I, No. 2, Tehran: Islamic Propagation Organization, 1984), p. 73.

3 Tabātabā'ī, "Islam and the Modern Age", p. 67.

4 Tabātabā'ī, "Islam and the Modern Age", p. 64.

5 It is often said that what characterizes Islam is its 'worldliness'. However, this usage of worldliness is quite misleading. Islam penetrates worldly affairs as a total Weltanschauung and indispensably imposes on Islamic people positive participation in the duties of this world. Therefore, the use of 'secularization' to express the recent Islamic movement cannot necessarily be justified, either.

6 See Chapter III.

7 Murtadā Mutahharī, "The Problem of Contradiction in Islamic Philosophy", in Al-Tawhīd, Vol. I, No. 1, (Tehran: Islamic Propagation Organization, 1983), p. 81.

8 See Chapter II.

9 Mutahharī, "The Problem of Contradiction in Islamic Philosophy", p. 81.

10 Tabātabā'ī, "Islam and the Modern Age", p. 73.

11 The Qur'ān, 16: 78. See, Mahdī Gulshanī, "Philosophy of Science: A Qur'ānic Perspective", in Al-Tawhīd, Vol. II, No. 1, (Tehran: Islamic Propagation Organization, 1984), pp. 22-23.

12 Murtadā Mutahharī, "History and Human Evolution -- Two Lectures", in Al-Tawhīd, Vol. I, No. 2, (Tehran: Islamic Propagation Organization, 1984), p. 114.

13 The Qur'ān, 17: 85.

14 Murtadā Mutahharī, The Goal of Life, trans. Alaedin Pazargadi, (Tehran: Foreign Department of Be'that Foundation, 1984), p. 56.

15 See, Mutahharī, The Goal of Life, p. 56.

16 Murtadā Mutahharī, The Human Being in the Quran, trans. Hossein Vahid Dastjerde, (Tehran: Islamic Propagation Organization, 1983), pp. 26-27.

17 Murtadā Mutahharī, "Understanding the Uniqueness of the Qur'ān", in Al-Tawhīd, Vol. I, No. 2, (Tehran: Islamic Propagation Organization, 1984), pp. 18-19.

18 The Qur'ān, 8: 22. See, Mutahharī, "Understanding the Uniqueness of the Qur'an", p. 19.

19 'Allāmah Tabātabā'ī, A Shi'ite Anthology, trans. William C. Chittick, (Tehran: Foreign Department of Be'that Foundation, 1981), p. 13.

20 Mahdī Gulshanī, "Science and the Muslim Ummah", in Al-Tawhīd, Vol. I, No. 1, (Tehran: Islamic Propagation Organization, 1983), p. 114.

21 We should also be careful about the usage of the words, knowledge and science. Today, knowledge generally means scientific knowledge, and science is segmented to individual sciences. These facts seem to indicate one of the peculiarities of human intellectual activities in the modern West, such as the 'taking off' of sciences from metaphysics and their fragmentation. Therefore, it seems that the German word 'Wissenschaft' or the Latin word 'scientia' can correspond to 'ilm' in their strict and original meaning.

The same stress should be put on the word dīn (religion). In the western connotation, a dualism is posited between das Heilige (the sacred) and das Profane (the profane), and religion belongs to the sacred or spiritual realm. On the other hand, Islam as dīn includes the secular or physical realm, not the spiritual one only and Islam does not distinguish between them. Therefore, the word dīn should be recognized as the total Weltanschauung which implicates 'religion'.

See, Yōichirō Murakami, Kindai-Kagaku to Seizoku-Kakumei (Modern Sciences and the Sacred-Profane Revolution), (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 1976).

22 Sayyid Muhammad Husaynī Beheshtī, "The Divine

Cultural Revolution", in Al-Tawhīd, Vol. I, No. 1, (Tehran: Islamic Propagation Organization, 1983), pp. 45-46.

Similarly to the case of the words, 'ilm and dīn, the Islamic conception of 'culture' is different from its western meaning. In the Islamic case, culture is not a parallel concept with economy and politics, and it implicates the other realms at the higher level as the total basis of this phenomenal world. The Islamic connotation of culture is much broader.

Then, it cannot be overemphasized that the Islamic revolution is "the cultural revolution". Beheshtī discusses the Islamic Revolution of Iran as follows:

"The cultural revolution is a revolution which needs to be launched and advanced with great care and dedication. It cannot progress and advance automatically by itself without any application of effort on the part of its participants. The participants, the human individuals, are themselves not any automatic, mechanical beings. One of the most crucial mistakes committed during the century of scientism was the assumption about man that he is a fully automatic machine. ... This type of thinking dominated the human minds nearly throughout this century of scientism. ... But fortunately, since the last thirty or forty years, this attitude is gradually changing. The thing which was regarded as a super-automatic, complex and delicate machinery was discovered to be the human body alone, and the body an insignificant fraction of the whole human existence.

... Man is not a human being just because of these physical characteristics. It is culture which fashions a real human being.

... The economic, civil, administrative, military, and other such problems should be given supplementary and secondary importance.

... Which is the most important and the principal aspect of this revolution? The answer is: the cultural aspect.

This revolution, fortunately, started as a cultural movement." (Beheshtī, "The Divine Cultural Revolution", pp. 48-56.)

23 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islamic Life and Thought, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1981), p. 150.

24 Ahmad Ahmadī, "'Irfān and Tasawwuf (Sūfism)", in

Al-Tawhīd, Vol. I, No. 4, (Tehran: Islamic Propagation Organization, 1984), p. 65.

25 For instance, according to Homā'ī, from the standpoint of 'irfān, both faith and philosophy should be restricted at some level of discussion, for faith tends to overemphasize the emotional aspect and philosophy has a tendency to overemphasize reasoning. On the other hand, theosophers ('urafā) can obtain the reality of things from their own origin by innate intuition and they can reach the ultimate truth. Thus, 'irfān is put at a higher level of the mode of Wissenschaft than philosophy and theology themselves. See, Jalāl al-Dīn Homā'ī, "The Renewal of Creation and the Concept of Substantial Motion", in Sophia Perennis (The Bulletin of the Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy), Vol. III, No. 1, Spring, 1977, p. 2.

26 Ibrāhīm Bayyūmī Madkour, "The Study of Islamic Philosophy", in Al-Tawhīd, Vol. I, No. 1, (Tehran: Islamic Propagation Organization, 1983), p. 86.

27 Mutahharī, "History and Human Evolution", p. 110.

28 Mutahharī, The Goal of Life, p. 56.

29 See, Murtadā Mutahharī, "Sociology of the Qur'ān: A Critique of Historical Materialism", in Al-Tawhīd, Vol. I, No. 4, (Tehran: Islamic Propagation Organization, 1984), pp. 77-82.

30 See, Mutahharī, "Sociology", I-4, p. 80.

31 Mutahharī, "Sociology", I-4, p. 81.

32 Mutahharī, "History and Human Evolution", pp. 113-114.

33 Psychologism puts great importance upon human perception at the present time and infers the past and future from the point of the present in the mental dimension. This tendency is called the centrism of the present here.

34 Therefore, the Islamic outlook on history (Geschichtsauffassung) is essentially fundamental and radical. Consequently, the usage of "Islamic fundamentalism" cannot be justified to express the recent tendency of the activities occurring in the Islamic world which are represented by the Islamic

Revolution of Iran, for example. The activities of Islamic people today are not extraordinary, but the necessary consequence of their faith to Islam. Thus, their recent activities are of Islam, or Islamism itself.

35 Mutahhari, The Human Being in the Quran, p. 45.

36 Mutahhari, "History and Human Evolution", p. 114.

37 Mutahhari, The Human Being in the Quran, p. 46.

38 Ash'arite theologians assert a kind of occasionalism in which they negate cause-and-effect relations. On the other hand, Islamic philosophers accept the phenomenal cause-and-effect relationship on the basis of the Divine Will and customs. It seems that, as Homā'ī says, the assertions of Ash'arite theologians and the philosophers are not necessarily opposite, but rather coincidental. See, Homā'ī, pp. 21-22.

39 Mutahhari, "Sociology", I-4, p. 90.

40 See, Mutahhari, "Sociology", I-4, pp. 90-106.

41 Mutahhari, "Sociology", I-4, p. 130.

42 See, Mutahhari, "Sociology", I-4, p. 121.

43 Mutahhari, "Sociology", I-4, p. 132.

44 Murtadā Mutahhari, "Sociology of the Qur'ān: The Islamic View of History", in Al-Tawhīd, Vol. II, No. 1, (Tehran: Islamic Propagation Organization, 1984), p. 110.

45 The Qur'ān, 13: 11. See, Mutahhari, "Sociology", II-1, p. 110.

46 Mutahhari, "History and Human Evolution", p. 107.

47 Mutahhari criticizes even the division of religions in the historical process.

"Certain Muslim intellectuals, contrary to Marx's view, claim that religion can be also divided into two different systems. ... so also religion is of two types: the religion of the rulers, and the religion of the ruled.

The religion of the rulers is polytheism (shirk), and the religion of the ruled is monotheism (tawhīd). ... The religion of the rulers is the opium of the society, and the religion of the ruled is a tonic for it.

... These intellectuals in this manner reject Marx's theory which considers all religions as an instrument employed in the interests of the ruling class, and presume that thereby they have rejected Marxism itself. They do not realize that what they have said, in spite of its going against the views of Marx, Engels, Mao and other Marxists, is nothing but a confirmation of the materialist-marxist interpretation of religion -- something which is far more appalling. After all they accept that the religion of the ruled has a particular class origin." (Mutahhari, "Sociology", II-1, pp. 105-106.)

Referring to the story of Abel and Cain, Mutahhari says,

"Islam takes the story of Abel and Cain to discuss the conflict between two human beings, ...

This story should not be mistaken for a parable of the class conflict, which is a Marxist idea. ... it [the Qur'ān] always tries to show that the progressive wars in history are those which are waged between men who have realized belief and faith and the profit-seekers ..." (Mutahhari, "History and Human Evolution", pp. 116-117.)

Although Alī Shari'atī develops his philosophy of history with the story of Abel and Cain, there is a slight discrepancy of understanding between Mutahhari and Shari'atī about this story. See, Alī Shari'atī, On the Sociology of Islam, trans. Hamid Algar, (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1979), pp. 97-118.

48 Mutahhari, "History and Human Evolution", p. 117.

49 See, Mutahhari, "Sociology", II-1, p. 114. In this context, the expression 'tawhīd-e wujud' (tawhīd of existence) of Shari'atī, instead of 'wahdat-e wujud', can be understood and justified. See, Shari'atī, On the Sociology of Islam, pp. 82-87.

50 Mutahhari, "Sociology", II-1, p. 127.

51 Mutahhari, "Sociology", II-1, p. 118.

52 Tabātabā'ī, "Islam and the Modern Age", p. 72.

53 Murtadā Mutahharī, "Sociology of the Qur'ān", in Al-Tawhīd, Vol. I, No. 3, (Tehran: Islamic Propagation Organization, 1984), p. 144.

54 Ahmadī, "'Irfān and Tasawwuf(Sūfism)", p. 71.

55 Ahmadī, "'Irfān and Tasawwuf(Sūfism)", p. 72.

56 Mutahharī, "Sociology", I-3, p. 144.

57 Mutahharī, "Sociology", I-3, p. 156.

58 Mutahharī, "Sociology", I-3, pp. 146-148.

59 The Qur'ān, 7: 34.

60 Mutahharī, "Sociology", I-3, pp. 142-143.

61 Mutahharī, "Sociology", II-1, p. 131.

62 Murtadā Mutahharī, Master and Mastership, trans. Mustajab A. Ansari, (Tehran: Foreign Department of Be'that Foundation, 1982), p. 53.

63 Mutahharī, The Human Being in the Quran, p. 60.

64 Akirō Matsumoto, "Revolution and Ontology -- A Study of 'The Beginning of Philosophy' by 'Allāmah Tabātabā'ī", in Bulletin of the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. I, (Niigata: The Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, International University of Japan, 1985), p. 43.

65 Mutahharī, "Sociology", I-3, p. 172.

66 See, Matsumoto, "Revolution and Ontology", p. 31 and pp. 43-44.

V

Coincidence

Today, the western mode of Wissenschaft(knowledge) is at the turning point and has been transformed greatly.

Knowledge which had originally been intentional toward the truth of God in cosmology was secularized in the dividing process of the sacred and the profane. Then, modern physics, or the divided sciences without metaphysics, have appeared in the modern age. They have been independent of theology or the religious dimension. Thus, the secular sciences have been flourishing amazingly.

However, recently, another integral mode of knowledge which implicates both the physical and metaphysical dimensions has begun to be sought again and attempts are being made to unify in harmony various sciences which had been divided and completely torn apart. In other words, the mode or framework of knowledge itself is in question in the general theory of knowledge(Wissenschaftstheorie), and other modes of knowledge which have often been called mysticism should

be noticed, in addition to the science and knowledge which depend upon human reason.

In such a modern tendency to reconsider and reconstitute the mode of knowledge, Michel Foucault proposes a word, knowledge(savoir), which has a more general and broad sense and perspective than ever before. Foucault defines knowledge(savoir) as follows:

This group of elements, formed in a regular manner by a discursive practice, and which are indispensable to the constitution of a science, although they are not necessarily destined to give rise to one, can be called knowledge. ... Knowledge is also the space in which the subject may take up a position and speak of the objects with which he deals in his discourse ...; Knowledge is also the field of coordination and subordination of statements in which concepts appear, and are defined, applied and transformed ... 1

The activity which treats such knowledge(savoir) is called archaeology(archéologie).

Instead of exploring the consciousness / knowledge(connaissance) / science axis(which cannot escape subjectivity), archaeology explores the discursive practice / knowledge(savoir) / science axis. 2

Thus, knowledge(savoir) is not a science, but sciences in general are essentially regulated by knowledge(savoir) in archaeology.

When statements are collected and a discourse emerges, the formation of statements, or the discursive

formation, crosses the thresholds of "positivity", "epistemologization", "scientificity" and "formalization".³ In another expression, the prototype of discourse, or knowledge(savoir), pre-exists before epistemologization and formalization. Then, knowledge(savoir) precedes sciences which are epistemologized and articulated.

Knowledge is not an epistemological site that disappears in the science that supersedes it. Science(or what is offered as such) is localized in a field of knowledge and plays a role in it. 4

As such a fundamental and preceding mode of knowledge is neglected, the world is divided into pieces epistemologically with only the criterion of scientificity.

If one recognizes in science only the linear accumulation of truths or the orthogenesis of reason, and fails to recognize in it a discursive practice that has its own levels, its own thresholds, its own various ruptures, one can describe only a single historical division, which one adopts as a model to be applied at all times and for all forms of knowledge: a division between what is definitively or what is not yet scientific. 5

Thus, science is relativized and given its boundary in knowledge. Now the intentionality toward the 'episteme', which has been justified without any

reflection until today, must also be relativized in the cultural peculiarities of the West.

The orientation towards the episteme has been the only one to be explored so far. The reason for this is that, because of a gradient that no doubt characterizes our cultures, discursive formations are constantly becoming epistemologized. 6

The new mode of knowledge proposed by Foucault is coincidental with the tendency of modern history and philosophy of science.

It has been thought for a very long time that the modern sciences, especially the natural sciences, develop and evolve according to their own logic and historicity without any intervention of other factors. However, it seems almost self-evident that such dogmatic optimism is wrong today. It is generally maintained that the rational sciences cannot be independent of other types of knowledge which have been called irrational, mystical and 'unscientific'. For example, classical physics, such as that of Newton and Kepler, is indispensably interrelated with Hermeticism, alchemy, Pythagoreanism(Zahlesymbolik), neo-Platonism and so on, which are generally referred to as 'mysticism'.7 The fact that the establishment of the rational sciences is essentially indebted to another mystical type of knowledge deprives the sciences of

their independence and supremacy and makes them a part of knowledge.

In accordance with such understanding concerning knowledge, the outlook of the history of the sciences and knowledge and of history in general cannot but be transformed. That is, it is necessary to pay attention to the discontinuity of knowledge and human activities. In the field of philosophy of science, the concept of scientific revolutions and the anarchistic theory about knowledge have been asserted, for instance.8 Optimistic historical evolutionism, in which present knowledge and sciences are supreme and past knowledge is regarded as a rough and incomplete figure of the present one, must be rejected.

The purpose of the study of history has been to reconstitute the various facts in order to form the chronological continuity so far. However, such continuity which regards the present as its center is rejected and the discontinuity of the world is accepted as it is. Foucault says:

[The discontinuous was] the material, which, through analysis, had to be rearranged, reduced, effaced in order to reveal the continuity of events. Discontinuity was the stigma of temporal dislocation that it was the historian's task to remove from history. It has now become one of the basic elements of historical analysis. ... The notion of discontinuity is a paradoxical one: because it is both an instrument and an object of

research; ... And because, in the final analysis, perhaps, it is not simply a concept present in the discourse of the historian, but something that the historian secretly supposes to be present: ... 9

Discontinuity is the basic supposition for history. It is not continuity, but discontinuity that should be researched by historians. Paradoxically speaking, history is the continuity of discontinuity.

Then, the mode of history is transformed from a "total history" to a "general history". In a total history,

it is supposed that between all the events of a well-defined spatio-temporal area, between all the phenomena of which traces have been found, it must be possible to establish a system of homogeneous relations: a network of causality that makes it possible to derive each of them, ... lastly, it is supposed that history itself may be articulated into great units -- stages or phases -- which contain within themselves their own principle of cohesion. ... A total description draws all phenomena around a single centre -- a principle, a meaning, a spirit, a world-view, an overall shape; a general history, on the contrary, would deploy the space of a dispersion. 10

History must be a kind of phenomenology.

Historical objectivism and evolutionism, which assert that independent materials from human recognition are self-existent and constitute a continuous history according to a certain principle, can no longer be maintained.

... history now organizes the document, ... The document, then, is no longer for history an inert material ...; history is now trying to define within the documentary material itself unities, totalities, series, relations.

... To be brief, then, let us say that history, in its traditional form, undertook to 'memorize' the monuments of the past, transform them into documents, ...; in our time, history is that which transforms documents into monuments. 11

Monuments are dependent upon history, which is a human activity, and they are not free from human subjectivity. History tries to grasp the documents as they are dispersed.

When it is assured that there is no stable and linear succession of history, causality cannot be an absolute principle of history either. Then, the possibility of the co-existence of causality and acausality, or a kind of integrally organic process, has to be sought.

The relativization of time and space in modern physics results simultaneously in the relativization of causality as a regulative principle of the world, for causality is the successive relationship among events which can be regulated in the fixed frameworks of time and space. In other words, causality becomes possible only in continuity. However, as discontinuity of events and history is noticed and emphasized, a

different mode of relations which is not necessarily causal is demanded. If it is supposed that such a mode is called acausal, acausality which transcends logical or temporal causality has to be investigated today. 'Acausal' no longer means 'unscientific'. It can be expressed differently by stating that the relationship between discontinuity and the continuity of discontinuity has to be elucidated.

Several scholars have already argued such a theme. For example, Paul Kammerer discusses "seriality" in the biological observation, and C. G. Jung asserts the theory of "synchronicity" in the psychological field.¹² Kammerer observes "coincidences" and defines their Serie(series) as "a lawful recurrence of the same or similar things and events". However, 'a lawful recurrence' does not imply causality, but coincidences "are manifestations of a universal principle in nature which operates independently from physical causation."¹³ According to Kammerer, "there is an a-causal principle active in the universe, which tends towards unity."¹⁴ Kammerer seeks to liberate the recurrence of events from physical or temporal causation, and moreover, reveal the acausal regularity and order of events, which is intentional towards the unity of the world.

Jung, on the other hand, defines "synchronicity" as "the simultaneous occurrence of two meaningfully but not causally connected events".¹⁵ Jung discovers many facts which are irreducible to causal relations in his psychological observation and criticizes the reductionism of psychology represented by the work of Freud. Jung maintains the synchronical mode of "manifestations of the unconscious mind" and that "the unconscious mind functions outside of the physical framework of space-time".¹⁶ Jung's assertion is similar to the theory of modern physics, such as of W. Pauli.¹⁷

There can be co-existent two or more different regulative logics in one unit. In the field of physics, for instance, microphysics which observes acausal and probable events and macrophysics which appears to be regulated by causality co-exist without mutual exclusion, although without doubt both describe aspects of one and the same world. Or, in biology, Darwinian evolutionism and Lamarckian evolutionism can co-exist. Biological evolution is causal in one aspect and teleological in the other aspect at the same time.¹⁸ The universe cannot be reduced to a simple linear principle. The universe is quite prolific and the world is the intersection of co-existent logics.

Such a mode of existence of the world can be applied to individual entities in the world. Then, the concept of "holon" proposed by Arthur Koestler seems very suggestive.

This dual aspect in the evolution of science reflects a basic polarity in nature itself: differentiation and integration. ... The individual itself is an organic whole, but at the same time a part of his family or tribe. 19

Koestler defines "holons" as "Janus-faced entities which display both the independent properties of wholes and the dependent properties of parts".²⁰ Any individual entity is a holon.

Every holon has two tendencies: the "self-assertive tendency" and the "integrative tendency".²¹ The self-assertive tendency is indispensable for each holon, to maintain its own autonomy and articulation. However, simultaneously, each holon is always intending to be integrated to the higher level of the hierarchy, which is the integrative or self-transcending tendency. These two tendencies are not simply inconsistent, but rather they positively and complementarily constitute one complete individual entity. An individual unit is essentially Janus-faced, that is, a holon. In other words, "all living organisms are 'open systems' which feed on energies and materials found in their

environment". An organism is "building up" the higher and more complex level in its integrative tendency, while it is "running down" as if it were a closed system in the self-assertive tendency according to "the so-called Second Law of Thermo-Dynamics".²²

It seems that Koestler's concept of holon can give an important suggestion regarding the problems which sociologists are confronting today.

The human individual, too, is a Janus-faced holon. Looking inward, he sees himself as a self-contained, unique whole; looking outward, as a dependent part of his natural and social environment. His self-assertive tendencies are the dynamic manifestations of his experience of wholeness; his integrative tendency is a manifestation of his partness. 23

The alienation of human beings from their society results from the fixation of unilateral relations from society to human individuals. The integrative or self-transcending tendency of individuals is neglected and suppressed by an entity at the higher level, or a society.

The suppression and restriction of the integrative tendency is inevitably accompanied by the overemphasis of the self-assertive tendency. Neo-individualism which has been established in modern western societies has put too much stress on each individual entity, as it has neglected the relations among them, which has

caused defamilization, interalienation and self-alienation.²⁴

There is no doubt that such imbalance between the two tendencies of human individuals has brought about the recent sociological problems and deprived human beings of the perspective on the total figure of the world. In such a situation, in order to find solutions to these problems, we should pay great attention to the facts that both human individuals and their society are open systems which are intentional toward the higher level of the hierarchy and that the relations between human individuals and society are fundamentally bilateral. With this understanding, the possibility can be developed that all entities are organically interrelated and that the problems of alienation disappear.

The attention to complementarity and bilaterality revives 'continuity', even if it is the continuity of discontinuity. Then, causality and acausality, human individuals and society, the self-assertive tendency and the integrative tendency are not mutually exclusive, but complementary. Their relations are intentional toward integrity, harmony and order.

The dominant concept is Unity in Diversity -- all is One and One is all. It echoes through the writings of Christian mystics, and is the

keynote in Buddhism and Taoism. ²⁵

Furthermore,

Thus Synchronicity and Seriality are modern derivatives of the archetypal belief in the fundamental unity of all things, transcending mechanical causality. Here again modern science provides a curious parallel to the mystical concept of Oneness. ²⁶

This assertion naturally reminds us of the modern Islamic attitude toward sociological problems which is derived from its ontological Weltanschauung.²⁷ They are quite similar and almost identical structurally, even though it should be recognized that their bases of speculation are very different from each other. We can discover here the symbolical 'synchronical coincidence' which characterizes the present tendency of human intellectual activities all over the world.

In this thesis, the western and Islamic modes of time have been scrutinized. Then, the fundamental question is not "What is time?", but "What does so-called time reflect and manifest?" This means that time is not a unilateral fixed and stable framework which regulates human beings and activities, but a reflection of a certain dynamic Weltanschauung. Time and space are the manifestations of the outlook on the world and universe in their broadest sense. Thus, time

and space must be relativized and given their own dynamics and possibility of transformation.²⁸ Human activities regulate and transform the mode of time at the same time as time influences and regulates human beings. They are interrelated and interpenetrating. If a certain *Weltanschauung* was constituted in the past, why can it not be constituted at present? It should be noticed that the *Weltanschauung* is always transformed and metamorphosed even at present. Human activities are actively related to its transformation.

Then, as for discussion of the temporal dimension and the history of the universe, such as the Creation (genesis) and the Final Day, the exclusive self-justification of each discipline has to be transcended. For example, natural sciences have a theory of the genesis of the world in accordance with their own logic which is independent of metaphysics and cosmology, while theology asserts that the sciences cannot refer to the genesis (or the Creation) of the universe because the sciences are physical and they cannot have the right to discuss the genesis which belongs to metaphysical affairs. Thus, the natural sciences and theology have been regarded as opposite to each other. However, today, the *epoche* and transcending of mutual exclusion between the rational sciences and religion

should be sought in the possible unity of the universe. It is possible that they are cooperatively intentional toward unity and harmony.

As long as time is the reflection of a *Weltanschauung*, there must be diverse modes of time, for it seems self-evident that there are diverse and different *Weltanschauungs* in the world. Then, these modes of time cannot be interpreted and reduced in a methodological framework. Thus, the western methodology, which has been regarded as universal until today, has to be relativized and restricted when attempts are made to apply it to other cultures and societies. Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and the cultures influenced by and based upon them, for example, each possess their own mode of time and temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) and therefore, the western methodological perspective toward other cultures, that is, so-called Orientalism cannot necessarily be justified as it interprets other cultures and thoughts with its own methodology.²⁹

What should be required now is the phenomenological methodological attitude in its strict and original meaning. Inquiring into a mode of time is nothing but a 'history'. Then, arbitrary and psychologistic interpretation of history and the mode of time from the point of the present cannot be

allowed. The past is the past. The future is the future. They transcend the present, even though they are manifested and perceived at present. This Anschauung (sight and intuition) is called 'ontological' in Islamic thought and 'archaeological' by Foucault. 'Archaeology' assembles dispersed events in the 'archive' as they are.³⁰

Now, we as observers must pay attention to our positions and our 'eyes'.

Objectivism has consistently neglected and erased the observers of events. Then subjectivism, which noticed the fallacy of objectivism, has sought to clarify and 'construct' the established position of observers. Today, however, intellectuals have begun to notice that construction is not adequate and rather that 'deconstruction' and 'decentralization' are valid and necessary. That is to say, the eyes of observers have to be dispersed, and they have to observe events and matters as objects from various angles. Thus, observers can obtain the total figure of an event. Events and matters transcend objective observation by the dispersed eyes of observers. Observers themselves also belong to events, and events and observers cooperatively constitute the universe as they are

interrelated and interact with each other.

Then, the universe cannot be reduced to a simple regulative principle. The tendency to displace qualitative difference and multiplicity by quantitative differences must be rejected. The universe is qualitatively dynamic, which is beyond quantitative reductionism. The existence of the universe is prolific, diverse and colourful.³¹

The universe is potentially continuous. In other words, its existence is undivided. In spite of this, the universe appears to be in discontinuity. This is because discontinuity is the articulation of the universe and the universe manifests itself as the phenomenal and perceptible world through articulation, or discontinuation.

Western culture and thought, which western people have ethno-centrally regarded as the core and seed of speculation all over the world, must be decentralized. This is just one of the manifestations of diverse and multiple human activities in the world. Human beings have no fixed center from which their activities are manifested and regulated. Islam is Islam. The West is the West.

However, simultaneously, all cultures in the world are actively interrelated and interpenetrating both synchronically and diachronically. Our first

requirement should be to receive and see the events and activities of people in other cultures without any preconceptions. Then, the attitude which considers that recent Islamic activities are anachronistic and have no relationship to us must be rejected. It should rather be said that modern Islamic activities and speculation are quite suggestive and that they possess the potentiality to transcend and erase the problems which the West is now facing. We should be methodologically relativistic and radically phenomenological. What we should inquire into is not the individual realms of divided and separated disciplines, but the culture itself which implicates all fields and disciplines.

Human beings and their activities are regulated and bounded by the pre-existing world and culture. We cannot exist outside the world of life (Lebenswelt) and we are beings-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-Sein). However, the Lebenswelt itself in which we are living is dynamic and transformable. Human beings can work upon and transform the world by their activities. The concept of being-in-the-world does not mean that human beings are confined and chained in prison. The world and human existence are open to the universe. The key to the door of the higher level is in our hands.

Notes

1 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (L'Archéologie du Savoir), trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith, (London: Tavistock Publications, 1974), pp. 182-183.

2 Foucault, p. 183. Foucault explains about the distinction between connaissance and savoir as follows:

"By connaissance I mean the relation of the subject to the object and the formal rules that govern it. Savoir refers to the conditions that are necessary in a particular period for this or that type of object to be given to connaissance and for this or that enunciation to be formulated." (Foucault, p. 15, note 2.)

Additionally, the translator, A. M. S. Smith says:

"The English 'knowledge' translates the French 'connaissance' and 'savoir'. Connaissance refers here to a particular corpus of knowledge, a particular discipline -- biology or economics, for example. Savoir, which is usually defined as knowledge in general, the totality of connaissances, is used by Foucault in an underlying, rather than an overall, way." (Foucault, p. 15, note 2.)

3 Foucault, pp. 186-189.

4 Foucault, p. 184.

5 Foucault, p. 188.

6 Foucault, p. 195.

7 See, for example, M. L. R. Bonelli and W. R. Shea, ed. Reason, Experiment, and Mysticism in the Scientific Revolution, (New York: Science History Publications, 1975).

8 See, for example, Paul Feyerabend, Against Method -- Outline of An Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, (London: New Left Books, 1975), or, Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, ed. Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

9 Foucault, pp. 8-9.

10 Foucault, pp. 9-10.

11 Foucault, pp. 6-7.

12 See, C. G. Jung and W. Pauli, The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche, trans. H. Kawai and Y. Murakami, (Tokyo: Kaimeisha, 1976).

13 Arthur Koestler, The Roots of Coincidence, (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1972), p. 85.

14 Koestler, The Roots, p. 86.

15 Koestler, The Roots, pp. 94-95.

16 Koestler, The Roots, p. 95.

17 See, Jung and Pauli, The Interpretation, or Koestler, The Roots, pp. 88-90.

18 In this context, the word 'teleological' does not necessarily require the Platonic idea and the transcendental subject. It rather corresponds to the 'creative evolution' proposed by Bergson or Koestler, for instance. See, Henri Bergson, L'Evolution Créatrice (Creative Evolution), trans. N. Magata, (Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten, 1979), and Arthur Koestler, Janus -- A Summing Up, (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1978).

19 Koestler, The Roots, p. 111.

20 Koestler, The Roots, p. 112.

21 Koestler, The Roots, p. 112.

22 Koestler, The Roots, p. 117.

23 Koestler, The Roots, p. 118.

24 For example, John O'Neill refers to these sociological problems in his book, Five Bodies -- The Human Shape of Modern Society, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1985). As he describes the several types of alienation of human bodies from society and the universe, O'Neill proposes "radical anthropomorphism" to transcend the situation of alienation and unite human individuals and the world organically again. His concept of radical anthropomorphism means that human individuals are a microcosmos of the universe as macrocosmos and that their relations

are not foreign to each individual, but bilateral and active. O'Neill's proposal of radical anthropomorphism seems similar to and interrelated with Koestler's concept of holon.

25 Koestler, The Roots, p. 108.

26 Koestler, The Roots, p. 108.

27 See Chapter III and IV.

28 Therefore, it should be noticed that a cultural anthropological methodology can be neither universal nor self-complete.

For example, Edward T. Hall defines time as "a core system of cultural, social, and personal life", and says:

"In fact, nothing occurs except in some kind of time frame." (E. T. Hall, The Dance of Life -- The Other Dimension of Time, New York: Anchor Press, 1984, p. 3.)

With such a recognition of time, Hall classifies time into two: monochronic time and polychronic time.

"Years of exposure to other cultures demonstrated that complex societies organize time in at least two different ways: events scheduled as separate items -- one thing at a time -- as in North Europe, or following the Mediterranean model of involvement in several things at once. The two systems are logically and empirically quite distinct. Like oil and water, they don't mix. Each has its strengths as well as its weaknesses. I have termed doing many things at once: Polychronic, P-time. The North European system -- doing one thing at a time -- is Monochronic, M-time. P-time stresses involvement of people and completion of transactions rather than adherence to preset schedules." (Hall, pp. 45-46.)

The validity of this cultural anthropological definition and analysis of time should be accepted restrictedly as one partial aspect of the whole figure of the world, for human beings work upon and transform the mode of time at the same time as they are temporal existence and regulated by time. The world and human activities are not simple enough to be classified and reduced into a describable principle.

29 For instance, in Indian thought, time and temporality are regarded as one of the Gods. In the

Atharvaveda,

"The Kala produced the very existence of the creation and the wealth thereof. The sun shines in the Kala. Verily in the Kala alone all the creatures find their existence. The organs like the eyes have their powers of perception due to Him."(4912)

"Stirred by Him, created by Him, this universe is firmly stationed in Him alone. The very Kala, being Brahma, the Mighty One, sustains the vast universe, the greatest sacrifice of His."(4915)

"The so-called ... Son, the Kala, produces the past and the future. From Him were born the Richas. Yajurveda was born of Him."(4919)
(The Atharvaveda, trans. Devi Chand, New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1982, pp. 782-783.)

Thus, temporality itself is a God, the Kala, which is identified with Brahman. Then, the western methodologies which regard time as an attribute of God or a substantial framework of the perceptive world cannot be directly applicable to the Indian conception of time.

Mircea Eliade analyzes the Indian mode of time according to the western dichotomy of the sacred and the profane. However, as the peculiarities of the Indian modes of time and Gods are recognized, his methodology does not always seem valid. Probably, Indian culture and religion do not have characteristics of the western-type dualism between the sacred and the profane. Moreover, it is possible that Indian religions are not 'polytheistic', which is regarded as the opposite concept of the western monotheism in the dichotomy of mono- and polytheism. For, it seems that each God is a manifestation of a certain integrative and transcendent principle which is called Brahman in India. Eliade's and the following anthropological methodologies should be re-examined critically. See, Mircea Eliade, "Traité d'Histoire des Religions" (Treatise of the History of Religions), in Eliade-Chosakushū, Vol. 1, 2 & 3, trans. H. Kume, (Tokyo: Serika-shobō, 1981).

30 See, for example, Foucault, pp. 79-131, Part III, "The Statement and the Archive". Foucault says:

"The archive is first the law of what can be said, the system that governs the appearance of statements as unique events. But the archive is also that which determines that all these things said do not accumulate endlessly in an amorphous mass, nor are they

inscribed in an unbroken linearity, nor do they disappear at the mercy of chance external accidents; but they are grouped together in distinct figures, composed together in accordance with multiple relations, maintained or blurred in accordance with specific regularities; that which determines that they do not withdraw at the same pace in time, but shine, as it were, like stars, some that seem close to us shining brightly from afar off, while others that are in fact close to us are already growing pale."(Foucault, p. 129.)

31 Gilles Deleuze refers to this theme on the basis of Bergson's philosophy. Deleuze criticizes the confusions between qualitative and quantitative differences, duration and space, continuity and discontinuity. Thus, Deleuze emphasizes the significance of the concepts of duration and the creative evolution. See, Gilles Deleuze, Le Bergsonisme (The Philosophy of Bergson), trans. A. Unami, (Tokyo: Hosei University Press, 1974), and, Henri Bergson, Essai sur les Données Immédiates de la Conscience (Essay on the Immediate Given of Awareness), trans. H. Hirai, (Tokyo: Hakusuisha, 1975).